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COMMENT
CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: THE EXPANDING
RATIONALE OF YOUNGER ABSTENTION
The lower federal courts traditionally have been viewed as the pri-
mary and powerful instruments "for vindicating every right given by the
Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States."' In recent years,
however, the Supreme Court,, under the judicially-created Younger doctrine,
has required lower federal courts to close their doors on constitutional
claims stemming From the enforcement. of state statutes and procedures in
pending state court proceedings.' The Younger doctrine has mandated this
result despite the existence of an independent federal cause of action, con-
tained in 42 U.S.C, § 1983, which permits federal injunctive relief to pre-
vent deprivation of federal rights by state action. 3
As originally enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 4 the Younger abstention
doctrine commanded federal court deference to state courts only in face of
pending state criminal proceedings which were deemed to provide an
adequate opportunity to present constitutional challenges and not to subject
the state defendant to great, immediate and irreparable injury.' In its 1976
Term, however, the Supreme Court, extended Younger abstention to state
civil contempt proceedings in Juidice v. Vail" and to civil attachment pro-
ceedings employed by the state to secure a civil judgment in Trainor v. Her-
nandez.' Under Juidice and Trainor, federal courts will be required to re-
frain from interfering with an expanded range of state proceedings,
thereby leaving to state courts the adjudication of claims that the enforce-
ment of a state law or procedure deprives an individual of rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution and federal laws. As a result, state rather than
federal courts may be responsible for vindicating federal constitutional
rights endangered by pending state proceedings.
There are four significant aspects to the Court's expansion of the
Younger doctrine in Juidice and Trainor. First, although the Court expressly
' F. FRANKFuttTER & J. LANDIS. THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME CouRT 65 (1927).
'The Court recently has evinced an increasing solicitude for the interests and preroga-
tives of states in a number of contexts. See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hod-
ory, 431 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1977) (state may choose to continue litigation in federal court de-
spite applicability of Younger abstention); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493.94, 493 n.35
(1976) (opportunity for full and fair litigation of fourth amendment. claims at state level bars
federal habeas corpus relief); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976)
(intrusion upon states' performance of essential governmental functions not within congres-
sional commerce clause powers); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808-09
(1976) (state purchasing activities held not subject to commerce clause review); Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976) (federal courts may not intrude into discretionary authority of
state and local officials even in 1983 suits).
3 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, soil in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (emphasis added).
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
5 Id. at 46-49.
430 U.S. 327 (1977).
7 43 1 U.S. 434 (1977).
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reserved for the future the question of extending Younger to all civil litiga-
tion pending in state courts, 8
 it nevertheless completely eliminated the
prior restrictive application of the doctrine only to pending criminal or
quasicriminal state proceedings. While Juidice and Trainor may be read nar-
rowly to limit the operation of Younger in the civil context solely to proceed-
ings where the state either has an exclusive right of action or appears in its
"sovereign" capacity as a moving party, the two cases also may be inter-
preted broadly to foreshadow-an eventual extension of Younger to all pend-
ing state civil proceedings, including those involving two private parties.
Second, the equitable considerations—the failure of a state court to provide
an adequate remedy and exposure to great immediate, and irreparable
injury—that will mandate an exception to the Younger abstention doctrine
have been severely limited by the Court's decisions in Juidice and Trainor.
Third, the combination in Juidice and Trainor both of extending Younger to
certain pending civil proceedings and of concomitantly denigrating the
equitable principles arresting the operation of the doctrine may reach the
same result as would the operation of the anti-injunction statute: 8 a flat de-
nial of federal injunctive relief in the face of any pending state proceed-
ings. In particular, the Younger doctrine may sanction this result in section
1983 suits, despite the Court's previous exception of section 1983 from the
commands of the anti-injunction statute." Fourth, the Court in Juidice and
Trainor appears to defer to state courts by invoking principles of comity
and federalism rather than by seeking to accommodate the competing fed-
eral and state interests involved in state judicial proceedings where issues of
federal and constitutional law are raised. As a result, federal claims which
support causes of action in federal court under section 1983 will be heard
in state courts. Such an outcome may contravene congressional intent in
enacting that statute.
This comment will first present a brief overview of the doctrinal un-
derpinnings of federal anti-injunction policy. In addition to tracing the ju-
dicial development of the Younger doctrine up to and including juidice and
Trainor, special emphasis will be given to the relationships between this doc-
trine, the anti-injunction statute and causes of action for state deprivation
of federal rights under section 1983. The next section of the comment will
explore the change which the Court's expansion of the Younger doctrine to
civil state proceedings has made in the rationale of federal abstention, and
logical extensions of this new rationale. To this end, the section will present
an analysis of the types of state proceedings which will merit Younger
abstention after Juidice and Trainor, and of the equitable considerations that
will allow an exception to the doctrine. It will be submitted that Juidice and
Trainor foreshadow a requirement that federal courts apply Younger absten-
tion in the face of all pending state court Proceedings. The final section of
the comment will discuss the implications of the revised Younger doctrine
for the viability of suits for injunctive relief under section 1983. It will be
"Trainer, 431 U.S. at 444-45 n.8;Juidice, 430 U.S. at 336 n.13.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (formerly 28 U.S.C. § 379, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, §
265, 35 Stat. 1162). The full text of the present statute states:
A court of the United States may nut grant an injunction to stay proceed-
ings in a State Court except as expressly authorized by act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
1 ° Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). See text at notes 59-69 iiifra.
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argued that as a result of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Juidice
and Trainor, access to federal courts for plaintiffs already involved—or
threatened with involvement—in state judicial proceedings will be ex-
tremely difficult, and that this denial of access is contrary to the congres-
sional intent in enacting section 1983. Lastly, the comment will discuss al-
ternatives to the Court's approach in Juidice and Trainor, including Senate
Bill 35," an amendment to section 1983 currently being considered by the
Senate judiciary Committee. It will be proposed that the amendment,
which, in part," would return federal abstention to parameters similar to
those originally enunciated in Younger v. Harris," represents a proper and
viable alternative to the Court's current interpretation of the abstention
doctrine.
I. FEDERAL ANTI-INJUNCTION POLICY
A. Doctrinal Premises
1. Origins of' the Younger Doctrine
The Younger doctrine was enunciated in the 1971 decision of Younger
v. Harris" and five companion cases.'" In Younger, the Supreme Court re-
versed a federal district court's grant of injunctive relief" to a state crimi-
nal defendant who had requested the district court, under the authority of
section 1983, to enjoin his pending state criminal prosecution." The
" S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
" In addition to ;unending § 1983 to respond to the Court's extension of the Younger
doctrine, S. 35, in part, is designed to respond to Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92
(1961) (municipalities not liable under § 1983 because Congress did not intend to bring mu-
nicipal corporations within the ambit of that section) by amending § 1983 to provide that
states, municipalities, and agencies or units of government may be sued tinder the statute, and
by establishing rules of liability with respect to such governmental entities. S. 35, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 2 (1),(2)(b)(c)(d). In addition, S. 35 would amend § 1983 to allow liability for dam-
ages to be imposed upon prosecuting attorneys and elected officials under certain circum-
stances, contrary to the Court's holding in lmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute
immunity for prosecutors from suit under § 1983 for acts in course of official duties). S. 35, §
2 (2)(e)(1).
" The bill does differ from the Court's decision in Younger v. Harris with respect to the
extraordinary circumstances which would allow federal injunctive relief despite the applicabil-
ity of Younger abstention. See text at notes 364-66 infra.
' 4 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
IS Samuels v. Mackell, 40i U.S, 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401
U.S. 216 (1971).
Harris v. Younger, 281 F.Supp. 507, 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
"401 U.S. at 54. The state defendant; John Harris, had been indicted for distributing
leaflets that allegedly violated the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. Cm_ PENAL. CODE
§§11400, 11401 (Deering 1953). Section 11400 of that Act defines criminal syndicalism as any
doctrine or precept which advocates unlawful acts of violence or terrorism to effectuate
changes in industrial ownership or political structures. Under § 11401, advocacy of such doc-
trines or precepts, including printing, publishing and circulating pamphlets, constitutes a
felony punishable by not less than one or more than Fourteen years in prison. Harris alleged
that California's enforcement of the Act would infringe upon rights guaranteed by the first
and fourteenth amendments. 401 U.S. at 39. On ale basis of these federal rights, Harris filed
a § 1983 complaint in the federal district court, requesting that court to enjoin Younger, the
District Attorney of Los Angeles County, from continuing the criminal prosecution pending
against him. 281 F.Supp. at 509.
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Younger Court held that federal courts must refuse to entertain suits seek-
ing injunctions against state criminal proceedings when brought by defen-
dants who otherwise have an opportunity to have their federal challenges
to the state criminal proceeding adjudicated in state court."
The Younger Court grounded its decision on three separate consid-
erations: equity, comity and federalism.'° The Court observed that the tra-
ditional doctrine that courts of equity should not interfere with criminal
prosecutions" particularly mandated federal restraint in the context of on-
going state criminal proceedings." In addition, injunctive relief would be
unwarranted when the petitioning party has available an adequate remedy
at law in the state proceeding and will not suffer irreparable injury absent
injunctive relief." Even more vital to the disposition of the case than the
principles of equity, in the Court's view, were those of comity." The Court
reasoned that comity—the notion that a federal government fares best in
an atmosphere of proper respect for the separate functioning of the
states2 4—precludes federal court interference with ongoing state court pro-
ceedings such as were present in Younger. 25 Finally, the public policy against
federal court interference with state court proceedings was based, accord-
ing to the Younger Court, upon the concept of federalism: Federalism re-
quires federal court abstention because a "National Government, anxious
" 401 U.S. at 43-54.
19 Id. at 43-47. As a general rule, however, federal courts previously had exercised re-
straint before interfering with state proceedings. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
487-89, 497-98 (1965) (request for injunctive relief granted against enforcement of state crim-
inal laws which inhibited exercise of first amendment rights). See generally Whitten, Federal Dec-
!arnica, and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of
Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. Rill:, 591 (1975); Developments in the Law–Injunctions, 78 HARP. L.
REv. 994 (1965).
20
 401 U.S. at 43-44. Equity's traditional reluctance stemmed from a number of inter-
secting factors. Among them: the historic absence in criminal proceedings of property inter-
ests of the kind,generally protected by equity: the dominance in criminal cases of issues of fact
within the province of the jury; and equity's dependence—for its efficacy and at times its
political survival—upon remaining a supplemental forum. Whitten, supra note 19, at 597-600.
See also Developments in the Law—Injunctioms, supra note 19, at 1029.
" 901 U.S. at 43-44. See generally Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935) (definition of
when a state proceeding is ongoing).
22
 401 U.S. at 43-44. Under traditional equity, a grant of injunctive relief by an equity
court against the enforcement of a statute or order would be permissible only where the com-
plainant could show that he had no adequate remedy at law and that he would suffer irrepar-
able injury should the subject litigation go forward. When combined with the general concern
for harmonious relations between state and federal courts, the circumstances in which equita-
ble remedies might be granted by federal courts against state activities were correspondingly
stiffened to require extreme and immediate irreparable injury. Thus, in Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), a decision which allowed a federal court to circumvent a general rule against
federal equitable interference, the Court used such equity principles, colored by the concern
for federal-state relations, to sustain an injunction against a threatened state prosecution. The
irreparable injury to be incurred by the plaintiffs in Ex Parte Young was an inability to deter-
mine their rights under a state statute without risking multiple prosecutions or harassment by
state officials. Id. at 166. The Younger Court relied heavily on cases like Ex Parte Young, which,
while allowing injunctive relief against state proceedings, emphasized the necessity of the pre-
sence of "great and immediate" irreparable injury to be sustained in the state proceeding by
the party requesting such relief. 401 U.S. at 43-47. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941);
Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
23 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
"Id.
"Id.
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though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal inter-
ests, always endeavors: to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the States."'"
While setting forth federal abstention as the general rule in such cir-
cumstances, the Younger Court noted that exceptions to this rule might be
required in certain "extraordinary circumstances." 27 These circumstances
would include bad faith or harrassment on the part of prosecuting officials
in bringing the action, the attempted enforcement of a state statute so
"patently and flagrantly" unconstitutional as to require immediate relief,
and other unspecified "unusual circumstances" 28 which would place a bur-
den on the defendant greater than the weight of a single criminal prosecu-
tion. 2" The Court noted, however, that a state defendant, subjected to a
single prosecution, did not face extraordinary circumstances warranting
federal interference. 3 "
The Younger abstention doctrine in its original form, then, was limited
to a requirement that federal courts show proper respect for one particular
state interest—the enforcement of criminal laws. Only slate criminal defen-
dants were denied access to federal court to adjudicate federal claims aris-
ing in state court proceedings, absent the presence of extraordinary cir-
cumstances."'
2. The Younger Doctrine, the Anti-Injunction Statute, and Section 1983
The judicial policy32 of prohibition and caution in granting federal in-
junctions against state proceedings," enunciated by the Supreme Court in
211 Id.
"Id. at 53-54.
28
 Id.
Id. at 46. This standard of irreparable injury is derived from Douglas v. City of Jean-
nette, 319 U,S. 157 (1943), in which the pattern of equitable principles which counseled fed-
eral restraint and yet would allow injunctive relief against the future enforcement of state
statutes was initially articulated. In Doieg/a.%, the Court maintained that the imminence of a
criminal prosecution, even though potentially involving the deprivation of constitutional
rights, would be insufficient injury to justify federal equitable relief The standard of harm
required to be shown would be injury greater than that to he suffered in the threatened pros-
ecution. Id. at 163-66.
401 U.S. at 49.
31 Id.
32 C. WRIGHT, LAW or FEDERAL COURTS 218 (3d ed. 1976). Professor Wright suggests
four reasons Itir the use of abstention doctrines by the federal courts:
(1) to avoid decision of federal constitutional questions where the case may be
disposed of on questions of state law; (2) to avoid needless conflict with the ad-
minist•ation by a state of its own affairs: (3) to leave to the states the resolution
of unsettled questions of state law; (4) to ease the congestion of the federal court
docket.
Id. at 218.
"3 See generally Wition'r_supra note 32, at 218-36. A second judicial abstention theory is
the Pullman abstention doctrine, which was developed prior to the Younger dOctrine. The
Pullman doctrine requires a federal district court to refrain from deciding controversies involv-
ing unsettled questions of state law combined with federal constitutional claims that may be
mooted or changed by state court interpretation of state law. The doctrine was first clearly ar-
ticulated in Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and was based
upon two notions. First, if at all possible, federal courts should avoid deciding questions of
constitutionality unless such decisions are absolutely before the court. Second, where questions
of undecided state law are intermeshed with federal questions, the state court's interpretation
of its own statutes might obviate any need for a federal court to consider the validity of the
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Younger v. Harris, paralleled a statutory policy contained in the anti-
injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 34 This statute requires that pending
state civil or criminal proceedings be absolutely free from federal injunctive
interference even when such proceedings present federal claims 33 over
which a federal court might properly exercise jurisdiction. 36 The original
prohibition against injunctive interference with state courts, contained in
the Judiciary Act of 1793,37 had been unqualified. 38 However, exceptions
slate statute under the Federal Constitution. Ostensibly, Pullman abstention operates only to
postpone a federal court's decision of federal constitutional questions until state court resolu-
tion of uncertain issues of its own laws. The federal plaintiff, whose case is sent to state court,
may preserve his federal forum fur any federal question not voluntarily litigated in state court.
England v, Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1966) (federal plain-
tiff formally required to reserve federal forum in order to return there following state court
adjudication of issues of state law). As a result, unlike the Younger doctrine which would fore-
close access to federal courts until a case reached the Supreme Court level, Pullman abstention
would allow litigation to straddle the lower state and federal courts.
The use of Pullman abstention has been criticised on a number of grounds. First, state
court adjudication of state issues followed by federal court adjudication of federal issues can
be an extremely expensive and time consuming process, as well as a substantial burden on
both judicial systems. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 384
U.S. 885 (1966) (six years); Spector Motor Service, inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)
(seven years). A second criticism of Pullman abstention is that litigants temporarily foreclosed
from federal court may well waive their right to return to that court by submitting all ques-
tions to the state court. Such waivers may lead to an erosion of federal jurisdiction over fed-
eral questions. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (direct review of state supreme
court finding of constitutionality of state law sought and obtained following prior federal
court abstention in Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167). Third, critics argue, to the extent fed-
eral constitutional law becomes relevant to the state court's construction of its own laws,
Pullman abstention is of diminishing usefulness in allocating decisionmaking between federal
and state courts. Developments in the Law—Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 19, at 1254,
1257. See Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366
(1957) (where a federal court abstains under Pullman, the state court must be made aware of
the constitutional challenge to state law being construed). A fourth criticism is that requiring
federal judges to abstain from cases involving questions of state law under Pullman abstention
is inconsistent with the requirement that local law be applied in cases arising under federal di-
versity jurisdiction. See Erie Railroad Co. v: Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For critiques of the
Pullman abstention doctrine see England, 375 U.S. 411, 423-37 (Douglas, J., concurring); Devel-
opments in the Law—Section 1983 and Federalism; supra note 19, at 1250-64 (1977); Field, The
elb.stention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1977).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
35
 Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281,
286, 294 (1970). See also Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132 (1941); Ok-
lahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 8 (1940); Hill v. Martin, 296
U.S. 393, 403 (1935).
3°
 In general, federal question jurisdiction is conferred upon federal courts by virtue of
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) confers original jurisdiction
upon federal courts for civil actions, under statutes like § 1983, to redress the deprivation of
rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws.
37 Judiciary Act of 1793, Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22 § 5, 1 Stat. 335. For a discussion
of the history of the statute, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231-38 (1972); Toucey v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 130.33 (1941). The legislative history of § 5 of the Act
of March 2, 1793 is vague, and members of the Court have differed in their interpretation of
the legislative intent behind this precursor of § 2283. Justice Frankfurter, in Toucey, argued
that the most probable explanation for its enactment was a "prevailing prejudice against equity
jurisdiction," given the limited nature of the provision enacted. Id. He rejected the notion that
the provision reflected strong feelings against unwarranted intrusion by federal courts upon
state sovereignty. Id. at 131-32. In Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive En-
gineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970), Justice Black, who also wrote for the majority in Younger, ac-
knowledged that the legislative motives behind the enactment of the anti-injunction provisions
were unclear. However, unlike Justice Frankfurter, Justice Black placed great emphasis upon
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to the statute's absolute language were carved out judicially by the Supreme
Court. 3 " In 1948, Congress, recognizing the validity of these judicial excep-
tions, amended the anti-injunction provisions" to include three excep-
tions" to the statute's absolute ban on federal injunctive relief against state
proceedings. 42
The decision whether causes of action under section 1983 Fell within
one of these exceptions—specifically, the exception for causes of' action ex-
pressly authorized by act of Congress"—ultimately produced a conflict
with the evolving Younger doctrine. Congress had provided, in section 1983,
for a federal suit in equity for the deprivation by states of rights guaran-
teed by the constitution and federal laws." As late as 1970, the issue
whether section 1983 fell within the "act of Congress" exception to the
anti-injunction statute, thereby allowing federal courts to enjoin pending
state proceedings in section 1983 actions, had not been resolved. In 1970,
the Court began to clarify the authority of federal courts to enjoin state
proceedings in three decisions—Atlantic Coastline Railroad v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 45 Younger v. Harris,'" and Mitchum v. Foster.'"
what. he termed ''the essentially federal nature of our national government." Id. at 285. In
language similar to that used to describe "Our Federalism" in Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, justice
Black stated:
When this Nation was established by the Constitution, each State surrendered
only a part of its sovereign power to the national government. But those powers
that. were not surrendered were retained by the States and unless a State was re-
strained by "die supreme Law of the Land" as expressed in the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of' the United States, it was free to exercise those retained powers
as it saw fit. One of the reserved powers was the maintainence of state judicial
systems for the decision of legal controversies_ .. Thus from the beginning we
have had in this country two essentially separate legal systems. Each system pro-
ceeds independently of the other with ultimate review in this Court of the federal
questions raised in either system. Understandably this dual court system was
bound to lead to conflicts and frictions.. .. The 1793 anti-injunction Act was at
least in part a response to these pressures.
Id. at 285-86.
" Section 5 of the judiciary Act of 1793 stales in pertinent. part that "nor shall a writ of
injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state."
"See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1972). The opinion in Mitchum outlined
six broad areas in which the Court previously had found judicial exceptions to the ban of the
anti-injunction statute prior to the 1948 amendment creating the present § 2283. Id. at 233-34.
Thus, federal plaintiffs with suits commenced under federal legislation providing for (I) the
removal of litigation from state to federal courts; (2) the limitation of the liability of ship-
owners; (3) federal inlerpleader actions; (4) federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages; (5) fed-
eral habeas corpus proceeding; and (6) price controls, were able to avoid the absolute ban of
the anti-injunction statute. Id. at '234-35 & nri. 12-17. Furt hermore, the Court had recognized
implied exceptions to the provisions allowing federal courts to enjoin state proceedings in
order to protect federal jurisdiction and judgments. ld. at '235.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646 § 1, 62 Stat. 968.
4 ' 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The three exceptions are for: (1) causes of action expressly
authorized by act of Congress; (2) injunctions necessary in aid of a district court's jurisdiction;
and (3) injunctions necessary to protect or effectuate judgments of federal courts.
42 • I'he only other amendment to the anti-injunction provisions took place in 1874, when
the provisions were amended to permit a federal court to stay state court proceedings which
interfered with the adminiStratiOn of federal bankruptcy proceedings. Rev, Stat.. § 720 (1874);
see Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231 § 265, 36 Stat. 1162.
43 Sec note 41 supra.
4 ' See text at note 3 supra.
43 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
44 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
47
 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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In the first of these cases, Atlantic Coastline," the Supreme Court in-
terpreted section 2283 strictly. The Court held that even when a federal in-
junction is proper under traditional equity principles," an injunction
should not be granted against a pending state proceeding unless the fed-
eral action falls squarely within one of sections 2283's three statutory excep-
tions." Section 1983 and the exception to section 2283 for acts of Congress
were not at issue in Atlantic Coastline." In determining the scope of the
anti-injunction statute's prohibition against federal interference with state
proceedings, however, the Atlantic Coastline Court indicated that "since
Congress itself set forth the only exceptions to § 2283," federal courts have
no inherent right to enjoin state court proceedings merely because such
proceedings might interfere with rights secured by the Constitution or fed-
eral laws. 52
 Thus, the Atlantic Coastline Court held that any federal injunc-
tive relief against state judicial proceedings must be based specifically upon
one of the exceptions contained in the anti-injunction statute.
The issue of whether section 1983 fell within one of § 2283's excep-
tions, seemingly was squarely presented to the Court in Younger v. Harris."
In Younger, the defendant in the state criminal proceeding, Harris, had
brought suit seeking injunctive relief under section 1983, 54 and the Younger
Court had requested a brief from the state on the applicability of section
2283 to the action. 55
 Thus, the Younger Court arguably could have relied
on Atlantic Coastline to reverse the Younger district court's grant of federal
injunctive relief by holding that section 1983 injunctive suits do not fall
within an exception to the anti-injunction statute. Instead, the Court care-
fully avoided this question" and relied on judicial notions of equity, comity
and federalism to enunciate a policy which—totally aside from the provi-
45
 398 U.S. 281 (1970). in 1967, as part of a labor dispute with another railroad, the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (union) began picketing a yard owned by the Altantic
Coastline Railroad (railroad). Id. at 283. The federal district court denied the railroad's re-
quest for an injunction against the union's picketing, at which time the railroad sought and
obtained the desired injunction in state court. Id. Subsequent to a Supreme Court decision in
the union's favor finding invalid a state court injunction against union picketing in another
railroad yard, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1969), the union petitioned the state court to dissolve the railroad injunction against its pic-
kets. id. at 284. Upon the state court's refusal, the union returned to the federal district court,
without pursuing a state appeal, and was granted an injunction against the enforcement of the
state court order. Id. at 284.
40
 See note 22 supra.
398 U.S. at 286-87.
51
 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the federal injunction was
properly granted under exceptions to § 2283, as an injunction "to protect or effectuate" the
1967 district court judgment denying injunctive relief to the railroad or as an injunction
"necessary in aid of the district court's jurisdiction. Id. at 284. The Court found the grant of
injunctive relief by the district court to be improper. Id. at 285.
52 Id. at 294-95.
55
 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
" 281 F.Supp. at 509.
55
 401 U.S. at 40.
'" Id. at 54. The Younger Court concluded that "[b]ecause our holding rests on the ab-'
sense of the factors necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention, we
have no occasion to consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which prohibits an injunction against
state court proceedings 'except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress' would in and of it-
self be controlling under the circumstances of this case." Id.
" Id.
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sions of the anti-injunction statute—forbade "federal courts to stay or en-
join pending state proceedings ...." 58
Finally, in 1972 in Mitchum v. Foster," the Supreme Court squarely
faced the issue whether section 1983 comes within the "act of Congress"
exception to section 2283. 1 " Relying on legislative history, the Mitchum
Court held that section 1983 was intended by Congress to be excepted
from the injunction ban of section 2283." The Court characterized section
1983 as a "vast transformation" of concepts of federalism" whose purpose
was to interpose federal courts between the states and the people." On this
basis, the Court concluded, Congress expressly had authorized injunctions
to carry out that purpose by its use of the "suit in equity" language in sec-
tion 1983. 64
In reaching this conclusion, the Mitchum Court noted that if section
1983 were not an express exception to the anti-injunction statute, the deci-
sion in Younger and its companion cases would be incorrect." The Court
reasoned that since the Younger cases were section 1983 actions, the abso-
lute ban imposed by section 2283, as interpreted in Atlantic Coastline, would
require Younger to be overturned to the extent that it allowed any special
circumstances to sanction injunctive relief against pending state proceed-
ings." In construing 1983 as an exception to section 2283, the Court's rul-
ing in Mitchum avoided disturbing"' the emergent Younger doctrine and in-
deed buttressed that doctrine with the caveat that the Mitchum decision in
no way questioned or qualified "the principles of equity, comity and
federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state
court proceeding."68
The Court's decision in Mitchum clarified the relationship between the
anti-injunction statute, the judicial abstention doctrine enunciated in
Younger, and the federal cause of action provided by section 1983. By hold-
ing that section 1983 injunctive suits fall within an exception to the absolute
5" Id. at 45.
5"
 407 U.S. 225 (1972). In Mitchum, the prosecuting attorney of Bay County, Florida ob-
tained a preliminary state court order to close Mitchum's bookstore as a public nuisance under
Florida law, Id. at 227. After inconclusive proceedings in state court, Mitchum sought injunc-
tive and declaratory relief in district court under § 1983 against the state court proceedings.
Id. A temporary restraining order, granted by a single federal district judge, was dissolved by
the three judge fed&al district. court subsequently convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 228!, 2284
(1970) to hear Mitchum's federal challenge to the state court proceedings. Id. The district
court. relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Atlantic Coastline to deny the requested in-
junction against the Florida proceedings on the grounds that the injunctive relief sought did
not come under any of the exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 315 F. Supp. 1387, 1389
(N.D.Fla. 1970) (per curiam).
"11) 407 U.S. at 238-43.
81 /d. at 242-43.
"14. at 238-39, 242.
8" Id. at 242-43.
" Id. at 242.
"s Id. at 230-31.
"Id.
" Id. at 243. The Mitchum Court emphasized its intent not to disturb the holding in
Younger with the statement that "[god:1y we decide only that the District Court in this case was
in error in holding that, because of the anti-injunction statute, it was absolutely without power
in this § 1983 action to enjoin a proceeding pending in a state court under any circumstances
whatsoever." Id.
"Id.
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bar to injunctions posed by the anti-injunction statute, the Mitchum Court
made clear that plaintiffs seeking an injunction under section 1983 are not
forbidden to do so by virtue of the anti-injunction statute. However, by in-
dicating that Younger abstention would be triggered after a suit for injunc-
tive relief against pending state criminal proceedings had cleared the hur-
dle of the anti-injunction statute, the Mitchum Court made clear that
Younger principles could prevent a grant. of injunctive relief in a section
1983 suit even though the anti-injunction statute would allow it. Thus, At-
lantic Coastline, Younger, and Mitchum, read together, indicate that a suit for
a federal injunction initially must qualify as an exception to the anti-
injunction statute, and subsequently must overcome the hurdle erected by
the Younger doctrine to obtain injunctive relief. 69
B. Extensions of the Younger Doctrine
The Younger doctrine originally was thought to compel restraint in the
grant of federal injunctive relief only in the face of pending state criminal
proceedings. 7° Immediately following the Court's decision in Mitchum, how-
ever, several circuit courts extended the Younger doctrine to protect pend-
ing state civil proceedings from section 1983 injunctive suits. 7 ' Within three
years of Mitchum, the Supreme Court, in Huffman v. Pursue Ltd.," extended
the Younger doctrine to encompass pending state civil proceedings linked to
or operating in aid of a state's criminal laws."
"" This analysis is confirmed in subsequent Younger doctrine cases. In Huffman v. 'Pur-
sue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), the Court noted that § 2283 did not apply since the federal
cause of action was brought under § 1983, stating that "while the statute [§ 22831 does express
the general congressional attitude which was recognized in Younger, it does not control the
case before us today." Id. at 600 n. 15. The requested injunctive relief was nevertheless denied
on the second threshold of Younger principles. Id. at 607. Accord, Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
379 (1976). See also Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.), application to stay state proceedings denied,
409 U.S. 1201 (1972). In Lynch, the circuit court ruled that although granting an injunction in
a 1983 action is unhindered by § 2283, the propriety of an injunction must also satisfy the
principles of equity, comity and federalism. Id. at 771, citing Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243. The de-
cisions in Lynch and Cousins were cited with approval by Justice Rehnquist in the majority opin-
ions in Huffman, 420 U.S. at 607 and in juidice, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977).
7" 401 U.S. at 55 & n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart contended that "since
[Younger and its companion cases] involve state criminal prosecutions, we do not deal with the
considerations that should govern a federal court when it is asked to intervene in state civil
proceedings ...." Id. at 55.
71 See, e.g., Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d. 769 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974). Contending that Mitchum determined only that there was no absolute bar to federal in-
junctive relief in 1983 suits, the circuit court in Lynch sustained a denial of injunctive relief
in a civil suit on the ground that although the state's interest in unfettered civil proceedings
might be less compelling than in criminal proceedings, the applicability of the principles of
equity, comity and federalism should not be "made to turn upon such labels as 'civil' or 'crimi-
nal' but rather upon an analysis of the competing interests in each case." Id. at 772-73.
72
 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
73 Id. at 604-05. The factors the Huffman Court seemed to find controlling in aligning
the otherwise civil nuisance proceedings before it with the state's criminal laws included: (I)
the presence of the state as the moving party: (2) the close relation of the civil proceedings to
statutes proscribing criminal activities; and, (3) the possibility of disruption by federal injunc-
tion of the legitimate efforts of the state to obtain compliance with state policies similar to
those embodied in its criminal laws, Id.
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In Huffman, the Court vacated a federal district court's grant of in-
junctive relief" in a section 1983 suit against the enforcement of a state
civil nuisance statute which the district court found to be an unconsti-
tutional infringement on first amendment rights. 75 While acknowledging
that the traditional reluctance of equity courts to interfere with criminal
proceedings was not as strong in civil proceedings,'" the Huffman Court
held that the Younger principles of comity and federalism" require federal
restraint in civil proceedings if such proceedings protect the state's interest
in the enforcement of criminal laws and facilitate compliance with stan-
dards similar to those embodied in criminal laws." Furthermore, the Court
expanded the Younger definition of pending state proceedings to include all
state appellate remedies. Thus, after Huffman, once state proceedings have
begun, a state defendant is required to adjudicate any federal claims arising
in a state criminal or quasicriminal proceeding without access to a federal
forum under section 1983 until all possible state appeals are exhausted. 79
State proceedings can not be interrupted at any stage unless the defendant
can show the existence of extraordinary circumstances qualifying as an ex-
ception to the doctrine." However, unlike the Younger Court which
suggested that certain unspecified situations might constitute extraordinary
circumstances, 8 ' the Court in Huffman limited the definition of extraordi-
" Id. at 611-12.
75 Id. at 598-99. In Huffman, appellants, an Ohio county sheriff' and county prosecutor,
sought to dose a theater operated by Pursue, Ltd., which screened allegedly pornographic
films. Id. at 595. These officials brought an action in the county court against the theater
owner under Ohio's public nuisance statute. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.01 et seq (Page
1971). Section 3767.01(c) of that statute provided For a determination that a place of business
showing obscene films constitutes a public nuisance. The penalty for engaging in such activity
required closure for any purpose for one year with the possibility of the sale of all personal
property used in conducting the nuisance. Onto Rev, CODE ANN. § 3767.06. 420 U.S. at 595-
97.
Rather than appealing the subsequent county court order under the statute which
closed its theater, Pursue, Ltd. sought and obtained an injunction in the federal district court.
under § 1983 on the ground that the enforcement of the Ohio nuisance provisions abridged
the exercise of first amendment rights, by allowing a temporary or permanent injunction
against the showing of films that had not preViously been determined to he obscene in an ad-
versarial hearing. Id. at 598-99.
"Id. at 604.
" Id. at 600-01. The Huffman Court placed heavy emphasis on the notion of comity as
opposed to equity and federalism as that component of Younger which required a "proper re-
spect for state functions, a recognition that the entire country is made up of a Union of sepa-
rate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways." Id. at 601, quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Comity counseled against any fed-
eral interference which prevented states from providing competent forums to vindicate their
statutory policies against constitutional challenges. Id. at 604, In support of this position, the
Court cited to a statement by Justice Black in Younger to the effect that "it has been perfectly
natural for our cases to repeat time and time 'again that the normal thing to do when federal
courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is nest to issue such injunctions."
Id. at 600, quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 45.
"Id. at 604-05.
" Id. at 609-11. Although the Huffman Court contended that a state appeal was avail-
able to Pursue, Ltd., it did not examine the nature or adequacy of that appeal process. Id. at
610. Bat see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1977) (when injunctive relief sought is
wholly prospective and not disruptive of ongoing state proceedings, Huffman exhaustion rule
is inapplicable).
HO 420 U.S. at 611-12.
"' 401 U.S. at 53-54.
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nary circumstances to either a bad faith or harrassing prosecution by state
officials" or the enforcement of a "patently and flagrantly" unconsti-
tutional statute. 83
The Huffman Court's rejection of the Younger doctrine's limitation to
state criminal proceedings represented a significant departure from the
original Younger v. Harris parameters for judicially imposed abstention. In
the wake of Huffman, the Younger doctrine apparently would: (1) require
federal courts to defer to state proceedings protecting interests other than
the enforcement of purely criminal laws; (2) preclude a section 1983 action,
once state criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings have begun, until state
appellate processes are complete; and (3) sharply limit the availability of
equitable exceptions to the doctrine's operation. By extending the Younger
doctrine beyond strictly criminal state proceedings and by limiting the
equitable exceptions to the doctrine, the Huffman decision foreshadowed
the Supreme Court's consideration of the Younger doctrine in Juidice v.
Vail" and Trainor v. Hernandez."'
C. Juidice and Trainor
1. Juidice a Vail
Juidice originated in a New York County court as contempt proceed-
ings instituted by judgment creditors to collect default money judgments."
Vail and other individual debtor defendants had failed to answer sub-
poenas for the disclosure of assets issued by their creditors' attorneys."
Under New York statutes," the creditors were then, allowed to institute
contempt proceedings" which required the debtors to appear in state court
and show cause why they should not be held in contempt.'" Vail and other
debtors, after failing to respond to such show cause orders," were fined 92
and upon failing to pay such fines,93
 were incarcerated or threatened with
incarceration until the fines were paid. 94 In federal district court95 the
debtors instituted a class action suit on fourteenth amendment due process
82
 420 U.S. at 602, 61 t.
83 Id. Although a state statute might conceivably meet a standard of "flagrant" unconsti-
tutionality, the Huffman Court emphasized that the facial invalidity of a statute would not be
an extraordinary circumstance under the Younger definition. Id. at 602. The Court further
implied that any exception for extraordinary circumstances should be construed narrowly. Id.
at 611.
" 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
8S
 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
86
 Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
87 Id. at 956-57. The disclosure subpoenas were issued by their creditors' attorneys act-
ing as officers of the court. The subpoenas required the debtors' presence at deposition to de-
termine their ability to satisfy a previously obtained judgment. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 5223,
5224 (McKinney 1977).
" N.Y. Jun. LAW §§ 756, 757, 767, 769, 770-75 (McKinney 1968).
"" N.Y. jun. 1..kw §§, 770, 772-773 (McKinney 1968).
"" Id. § 757.
8 ' The show cause orders were issued by county judges, Juidice and Aldrich, in accord-
ance with N.Y. Jun. LAW § 757. 406 F. Supp. at 957.
" 406 F. Supp. at 957.
83 1d.
94 Id. at 965-67. -
" Vail v. Quinlan, 387 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision to convene three judge
court to consider the merits).
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grounds under section 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against the operation of the New York contempt proceclures."°
The three judge district court,•" interpreting Huffman as extending
the Younger doctrine beyond criminal proceedings only insofar as the de-
sired federal injunction would result in disrupting quasicriminal proceed-
ings," concluded that the Younger doctrine was inapplicable because the in-
stant civil contempt proceedings were related neither to New York's crimi-
nal laws nor to the effectuation of such laws. 9" In addition, the district
court found that. Huffman required that a federal court refuse to hear a re-
quest for injunctive relief only when the prospective federal plaintiff has a
meaningful opportunity to be heard by a competent state tribunal.'" The
district, court. determined that the New York contempt procedures did not
provide judgment debtors with adequate notice that failure to appear at
show cause hearings would result in imprisonment and that the statutory
scheme allowed for ex parte commitment to jail. 10 ' Maintaining that "a find-
ing of contempt can be properly made only upon a hearing with both par-
ties present,"'°2 the district court determined that the New York statutory
scheme did not include the requisite meaningful opportunity for the ad-
judication of constitutional claims.'" 3 Thus, the district court concluded that
Younger abstention did not prevent issuance of an injunction against the
present and future enforcement of the New York civil contempt statutes. 10 "
" Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 953, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(three judge panel deci-
sion on merits). Suit in federal district court was brought against the county sheriff', Quinlan,
who incarcerated plaintiffs or had the power to do so, and county judges, juidice and Aldrich,
who issued the ex parte commitment orders against the federal plaintiffs. At the district court
level, the individual creditors were also defendants. Id. at 956-57.
" 406 F. Supp. 951. The convening of a three judge court fir the hearing of suits re-
questing injunctive relief against the enforcement of state laws formerly was required under
28 U.S.C. * 2281, This section also allowed for a direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court upon the decision of the three judge panel, as was the case in both Juidice and Trainor.
Section 2281 and its companion section dealing with actions seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of federal laws, § 2282, were repealed by Act of August 12, 1976, P. L. 94-381 §§ 1,1a, 90 Stat.
1119. Section 7 of the repealing Act provided that the Act would not apply to any action
commenced on or before August 12.1976.
"" 406 F. Supp. at 958. The district court in Vail also referred to Anonymous v. Asweia-
tion of the Bar of N.Y. City, 515 F. 2d 427 (2nd Cir. 1975). in which state disbarment pro-
ceedings were found to be comparable to those in Huffman as quasicriminal and part of a
state's special interest in regulating the bar. hi.
"Id, at 958.
um id.
101 Id. at 959-60. The district court also sustained due process challenges grounded on
the failure of the New York statutory scheme to inform judgment debtors of their right to
counsel and on the punitive nature of the fines imposed. Id.
" 2 Id, at 959.
1 " 2 Id. at 959-60. In this connection, the district court analogized the case before it to
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In Gerstein, the state defendants in a criminal proceed-
ing were held for trial on the information of the prosecutor alone, without any judicial hear-
ing as to probable cause. Id. at 105-06. Under the Florida statutes challenged in Gerstein, a
person could be arrested on information without. a warrant and jailed or otherwise restricted
pending trial. Id. at 116. The Court fbund that the prosecutor's responsibility in the enforc-
ment of the state's laws was inconsistent with the role of a neutral and detached magistrate
making an assessment of probable cause to restrain an accused party's liberty pending trial as
required by the fourth amendment, Id, at 117-19. The Gerstein Court upheld the issuance of
an injunction against the continued enforcement of the challenged statutes. Id. at 126.
1 " 406 F. Supp. at 960. All the challenged sections were declared unconstitutional with
the exception of those which dealt with the issuance of habeas corpus writs, the execution
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On direct appeal, the Supreme Court,'° 5 in a six to three decision, re-
versed the district court's grant of injunctive relief'°" and held that the
principles of federalism and comity enunciated in Younger and Huffman are
applicable to state civil contempt proceedings,'° 7 and that therefore federal
injunctive relief in this context is improper."" Moreover, with regard to
equitable exceptions to the Younger doctrine, the Court held that a mere
opportunity to be heard rather than an actual hearing in state court is suf-
ficient to invoke Younger principles of federal noninterference.'" Writing
for the majority,"° Justice Rehnquist conceded that the district court's
reading of Huffman was not an "implausible" one."' Huffman, the pi/dice
Court admitted, had limited the applicability of principles counseling fed-
eral restraint to the quasicrirninal proceedings sought to be enjoined in that
case"' and explicitly had made no pronouncements on the applicability of
such principles to all civil litigation. 13 The juidice Court observed, however,
that the "more vital consideration" underlying the Younger doctrine was the
principle of comity which required a proper respect for independent state
functions. ' 14 In evaluating the strength of the state interest served by pre-
cluding federal injunctive interference with civil contempt proceedings, the
Court observed that the contempt power was essential to the administration
of a state's judicial system."' As such, while contempt proceedings were
"[p]erhaps ... not quite as important as is the State's interest in the en-
forcement of its criminal laws, or even its interest in the maintenance of a
quasi-criminal proceeding such as was involved in Huffman," the principles
of comity and federalism nonetheless mandate that district courts refuse to
grant injunctive relief when such relief is sought against state civil contempt
proceedings.'" To do otherwise, the majority reasoned, would unduly
interfere with legitimate state activities—which the Court failed to identify
warrants in the absence of an undertaking and the filing of interrogatories and proofs. N.Y.
Jun. LAW §§ 765, 767, 769, 771 (McKinney 1968). Id. at 960.
" 5
 430 U.S..327 (1977).
1 " 406 F. Supp. at 960.
1 '1 '430 U.S. at 334-36.
1 " Id. at 338-39.
' 00 1d. at 336-37.
IS Justice Rehnquist maintained initially that the Court was obliged to examine the
standing of plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief in the district court under the case or con-
troversy requirement of art. III. U.S. CoNsT., art 111. The Court maintained that the named
plaintiffs who had already been jailed and released no longer had a live controversy in which
injunctive relief could be granted. Thus, the standing of parties subject to the New York con-
tempt proceedings lasted only as long as the order imposing fines and requiring imprison-
ment. Id, During this period, however, the state contempt proceedings were pending, which
brought Younger principles into play. Id. at 333.
1 " Id. at 334.
112 Id. The proceedings in Huffman involved the enforcement of a public nuisance stat-
ute. See discussion in text at notes 77-78 supra.
13 430 U.S. at 333-34, quoting Huffman,420 U.S. at 607. In Huffman, the Court main-
tained that its decision made "no general pronouncements upon the applicability of Younger to
all civil litigation." 420 U.S. at 607. At the same time, however, the Huffman Court described
that case as Younger's "civil counterpart." Id. at 61I.
'" 430 U.S. at 334. The source of this language is Justice Black's opinion in Younger,
401 U.S. at 44, where he states that comity is the underlying reason for counseling restraint of
federal equitable interference. Id.
430 U.S. at 335.
" 6 Id,
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specifically—and, simultaneously, would reflect negatively upon the state
court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.' ' 7
The Court then addressed the equitable conditions which allow a fed-
eral court to interfere with a pending state proceeding even when Younger
abstention is otherwise applicable. The Court found that the measure of an.
adequate state proceeding is not an actual hearing of the federal claims in
state court, but rather the mere opportunity to raise such claims in the state
proceeding)" The plaintiffs' failure to appear and present their federal
claims in the state contempt proceedings therefore did not render the pro-
ceedings inadequate to entertain federal claims. Finally, the Court rejected
the contention that. the contempt proceedings fell within either of the two
extraordinary circumstances meriting injunctive ,relief—a bad faith pros-
ecution or the enforcement of a "flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional
state statute 1 l 9 —since no allegation of bad faith had been made in the orig-
inal complaint or proven,' 2° and since the contempt statutes were not "pat-
ently and flagrantly violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause ... and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might
be made to apply [them].nn The majority consequently determined that
the district court's grant of injunctive relief was in error.'"
justice Stevens, concurring in the Court's judgment)" contended that
the major premise underlying the Younger doctrine is that injunctive relief
is unavailable in the presence of an adequate remedy at law.'" Accord-
ingly, the critical question for Justice Stevens was not the nature or impor-
tance of the state's interest in continuing the proceedings, but whether the
contempt proceedings in Juidice provided a constitutionally adequate rem-
edy.'" Finding that the Court's recitation of the facts showed that the New
York procedure provides for adequate notice and opportunities to be
heard, Justice Stevens summarily concluded that the New York contempt
procedures did not violate principles of due process and thus that the
Court had applied Younger properly. 126
"17 am 336.
"" Id. at 336-37. The Juidice Court distinguished Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),
see note 103 supra, from the case before it on the grounds that the Gerstein injunction was
granted because the issue of the legality of the pre-trial detention could not he raised in the
defense of a criminal prosecution, not because there was no hearing before the detention. Id.
at 108 n.9. This is the same language relied upon by the district court in Vail v. Quinlan, 406
F. Supp. at 958-59.
' 1 "h/. at 338, quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611, citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54.
' 2 " Id. at 338. With regard to the bad faith exception, the Court stated:
While some paragraphs of the complaint could be construed to make such allega-
tions as to the creditors, there are no comparable allegations with respect to ap-
pellant justices who issued the contempt orders. This exception may not be
utilized unless it is alleged and proved that they are enforcing the contempt pro-
cedures in bad faith or are motivated by a desire to harass.
Id.
"1 430 U.S. at 338, quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611.
"2 430 U.S. at 336-39.
"2 Id. at 339-41.
'" Id, at 339.
"5 Id. at 340. Justice Stevens maintained that even ultimate success in an unconsti-
tutional jticlical proceeding would not provide a substitute for due process protections. Only
an adequate remedy for the alleged federal wrung would do. M. at 340-41.
'" Id. at 341.
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In dissent,' 27 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, strongly
disagreed with the Court's extension of Younger to state civil proceedings,
particularly in an action brought under section 1983. Justice Brennan con-
tended that such an extension of Younger crippled the congressional scheme
embodied in section 1983 by denying plaintiffs access to federal court for
vindication of federal claims. 128 In his view, no state interests are equal in
importance to a state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and thus no
other state interests are sufficient to override the congressional mandate in
section 1983 to adjudicate federal claims in federal court.' 2" Moreover, Jus-
tice Brennan suggested that requiring a section 1983 plaintiff to present
constitutional claims in state courts may run counter to the state's own
interest in supporting the constitutionality of state statutes. 13 t' If Younger
applies to state civil proceedings between purely private parties, Justice
Brennan noted, the state would not be present to protect the consti-
tutionality of its own statutes. By contrast, a section 1983 suit in federal
court names the state or its officials as defendants, and the litigation fo-
cuses squarely on the issue of the validity of the statute, with the state de-
fending its own interest directly."' Finally, Justice Brennan questioned
whether the Court's decision' 32 "properly reflected the nature of our
federalism" and whether by
[a]dopting the premises that state courts can be trusted to
safeguard individual rights, the Court has gone on to limit the
protective role of the federal judiciary ... [and] in so doing it
has forgotten that one of the strengths of the federal system is
that it provides a double source of protection for the rights of
our citizens. Federalism is not served when the federal half of
that protection is crippled.'"
Accordingly, Justice Brennan concluded that the Court's refusal to allow
access to federal courts under section 1983—on the basis of comity and
federalism—constituted "federal abdication" in the face of express congres-
sional intent that federal courts protect and vindicate federal civil rights.'"
127 id. at 341-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart also dissented, basing his opin-
ion on Pullman abstention principles. Id. at 347-48. See discussion of Pullman abstention at
note 33 supra. Under Pullman, Justice Stewart maintained that the district court opinion
should have been set aside and its determination on the merits stayed until a New York court
had reached its own resolution of the proper interpretation of the New York contempt stat-
utes, Id. at 348 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I 28 Id. at 341-43. Justice Brennan argued that by relegating would-be § 1983 plaintiffs
to state court to litigate federal claims, the Younger civil extension abrogated the congressional
intent in that statutory scheme to interpose the federal court between the state and the people
to protect federally secured rights regardless of the pendency of state proceedings. Id. at 342.
See generally Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-43 (1972).
"" 430 U.S. at 344-45.
""/d. at 345-46.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 346-47. Justice Brennan suggested that the majority's curtailment of § 1983
was not surprising in light of a recent series of Supreme Court decisions made'in the name of
federalism. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Orgn., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Hicks
v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 322 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
"3
 430 U.S. at 446-47, quoting Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. RI:V. 489, 502-03 (1977).
' 34 430 U.S. at 343-44.
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2. Trainor v. Hernandez
In Trainor v. Hernandez, 135 decided two months after juidice, the Su-
preme Court again applied the Younger doctrine in a civil context.. Trainor
began as an attachment proceeding"' instituted by the Illinois Department
of Public Aid (IDPA) to satisfy a money judgment for the recovery of wel-
fare funds alleged to have been fraudulently obtained.'" Hernandez
brought a section 1983 action in federal district court seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against the attachment proceedings on fourteenth
amendment due process grounds.'" 8 Hernandez alleged that the Illinois at-
tachment procedures'"" violated due process by allowing a creditor, without
hearing, to obtain automatically a writ of attachment from a clerk of' courts,
predicated merely on conclusory allegations and certain procedural infor-
mation.' 4° The section 1983 action sought to enjoin both the present and
future enforcement of the challenged sections against Hernandez and
members of the class he represented."
A three judge district court specifically considered and rejected the
applicability of liqfman to prevent federal court interference with the state
attachment proceedings on the grounds that the proceedings were civil in
nature' 42 and provided a cause of action for private as well as public par-
ties."" Moreover, the district court ruled that even if the Younger doctrine
were applicable federal injunctive relief was nonetheless proper since the
statutes in question were "patently and flagrantly violative of the constitu-
tion." Consequently the case fell within an express exception to the Younger
doctrine.'"
In a five to lour decision on direct appeal, 145 the Supreme Court re-
versed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings to determine the adequacy of the state proceeding for entertain-
ing the federal claims.'" Finding that the injunction interfered with a suit
133 431 U.S. 434 (1977). The Court. which decided Juidice and Trainor was composed of
the•same Justices.
13" Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 759 (N.D. 111. 1975).
137 Id. at. 758-59. The IDPA attached funds of the plaintiffs, which they held in a credit
union, to secure a possible judgment in a separately filed state suit, under REV. SCAT'. ch.
11, §.§ I, 2, 2a, 6, 8, 10, 14 (1973 & Supp. 1974). The separate state action sought the return
of public assistance funds allegedly fraudulently received by plaintiff's' concealment of assets in
applying for welfare. M.
13"405 F. Supp. at 757. Tile defendants in the federal district court were the County
Clerk of Cooks County, Danaher, individually and in his official capacity and a class of all
other persons similarly situated, along with officials of the IDPA, Trainor and O'Malley. Plain-
tiffs Juan and Maria Hernandez represented themselves and all members of a similarly situ-
ated class. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 435-39 (1977).
'"	 Riv. STAT. ch , 11, §* 1, 2, 2a, 6, 8, 10, 14 (1973 & Supp. 1974). The plaintiffs
claimed these sectitins of the Attachment Act were unconstitutional on their face and as
applied, in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment. 405 F. Supp. at
759.
14" 405 F. Stipp, at 762.
' 4 ' Id.
142
 Id. at 759.
73 1d. at 760. The district court contended that it was mere happenstance that the State
of Illinois was a party to the present action. Id.
" 4 Id.
145 431 U.S. 434 (1977). See note 97 supra.
4" Id. at 447-48.
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brought by a state in its sovereign capacity, 147 the Court held that.
Younger-Huffman principles of comity and federalism require federal nonin-
terference with civil enforcement proceedings brought by a state in vindica-
tion of its sovereign activities. 148 Writing for the majority, Justice White
posed the issue before the Court as the proper role for a federal court in a
case pending before it, and otherwise properly within its jurisdiction, when
litigation between the same parties over the same issues is pending in a
state court.'" The Court approached this issue by reviewing prior Younger
doctrine cases.
Beginning with Younger v. Harris, the Trainor Court noted that the
proper role for the federal court in that case had been to dismiss the sec-
tion 1983 action so long as the federal claims raised could be heard in the
state court.'" The Trainor Court, while acknowledging that the first justifi-
cation for federal abstention in Younger had been equitable consid-
erations,' 5 ' determined that comity and federalism were "more vital con-
sideration[s]" for the Younger Court than equity. The Trainor Court ob-
served that comity and federalism counseled both federal noninterference
with legitimate state functions, particularly the operation of state courts,
and respect for the independence of state governments.'" The equitable
considerations relied upon in Younger v. Harris, the Trainor Court main-
tained, required only that two conditions be met before injunctive relief
could he denied: the existence of an adequate remedy in state court 153 and
the absence of extraordinary circumstances amounting to great, immediate
and irreparable injury. 15 " Thus, according to the Trainor Court, federal ju-
dicial restraint in Younger v. Harris was premised on an assumption that the
pending state proceeding will provide an adequate forum for the full ad-
judication of Federal constitutional claims.'" Given this presumption of
adequacy, a grant of federal injunctive relief, absent the potential for great
and immediate irreparable injury to the prospective federal plaintiff would
reflect negatively on the states' ability to protect federal rights and would
interefere with the implementation of substantive state policies.'"
The Trainor Court continued its historical analysis of the Younger doc-
trine by examining the decision in Huffman. The Court initially observed
that the equitable principle of non interference with criminal proceedings
did not apply strictly to counsel restraint in Huffman. The more important
justification for the refusal of federal injunctive relief in that case, the
Trainor Court maintained, had been the considerations of comity. Comity,
noted the Trainor Court, "counseled restraint as strongly in the context of
the pending state civil enforcement action as in the context of a pending
criminal proceeding."'" The Trainor Court completed its review of Younger
'" Id. at 444.
1411 Id.
' 45 Id. at 440.
' 55 1d.
"' Id.
" 2 Id. at 441.
353 1d.
154 1d. at 442 & ri.7.
I" Id. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 577 (1973).
356 Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 443.
' 57 /d. at 443.
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doctrine cases by declaring that //Lidice had held that the state interest in
vindicating the regular operation of its judicial system through the con-
tempt process—whether that process was labeled civil, criminal or quasi-
criminal—was sufficiently important to preclude federal injunctive relief
unless Younger standards were met.' 5 8
Turning to the case before it, the Court characterized Illinois' use of
the attachment proceedings as a means of' vindicating an important state
interest; in this instance, the fiscal integrity of a state welfare system.'" In
this way, the Court shifted its focus from the plaintiffs' opportunity for
presenting his federal claims in the state proceedings to an examination of
the state's interest in continuing its own proceedings. The strength of Il-
linois' interest was evidenced by the pendency of the state's underlying suit
for the Welfare funds. and of the attachment proceeding,m its presence as
a party in its role of administering its public-assistance programs, 10 ' and its
option to protect the fiscal integrity of' its programs in a criminal action.'"
The Court concluded that although Illinois' interest might not be as great
as an interest in the continuance of a state criminal or quasicriminal pro-
ceeding, considerations of comity and federalism enunciated in Younger,
Huffman  and Juidice required federal noninterference with Illinois' decision
to employ the attachment process.'" Thus, the Court took the position that
Younger applies when a state, acting in its sovereign capacity, utilizes a civil
enforcement proceeding to vindicate one of its interests.'" The Court
maintained in a footnote, however, that the occasion to decide the applica-
bility of Younger to all civil litigation had not yet arisen. 10 "
Having thus determined that Younger principles counseled federal re-
straint, the remaining question before the Court was whether the equitable
conditions which allow a denial of injunctive relief had been met. In assess-
ing the possibility for irreparable injury from the continuance of the state
proceedings, the Court applied only two categories of "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" to the facts of Trainor—whether the state suit was brought in
bad faith or with the intent to harass the defendants,'" and whether the
I" Id. at 443-44.
' 55 !d. at 444.
1 " Id. The Court considered the 'proceedings for a writ of attachment to be part of II.
linois' civil suit to recover the welfare payments, rather than as a separate pending action in
the state court. Id.
' 6 ' Id. The Court dismissed the district court's finding that Younger policies were irrelev-
ant since the presence of the state as a party to the proceedings was a coincidence at best.
Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 760.
' 02 431 U.S. at 444. In analyzing Illinois' use of the attachment proceedings, the Court
particularly noted that the federal plaintiffs could have been charged with a criminal violation
under ILL REv. STAT. ch . 23, §§ 11-21 (1973 & Supp. 1974), for fraudulently obtaining wel-
fare funds. Instead, Illinois chose to bring a civil suit. 431 U.S. at 435.
'03
	 at 444.
"4 Id. The opinion does not define sovereign capacity or cite authorities for this propo-
sition. Rather, in a footnote, the Court observed that 28 U.S.C. §- 2283, the anti-injunction
statute, which did not apply in this instance because the action was brought under 1983,
does not distinguish between civil and criminal actions in prohibiting federal injunctive relief
Id. at 444-45 n.8.
165 Id. at 444-45 n.8. In addition to the concern for the integrity of state courts and the
independence of states in carrying out their substantive policies, the Court also determined
that a grant of injunctive relief' may force states to engage in "duplicative" litigation. foreclose
state opportunity to construe their own statutes, and reflect negatively on a state court's ability
to adjudicate constitutional claims. Id. at 445.
r86
	 at 446.
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state statute enforced was "flagrantly and patently violative of express con-
stitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph and in
whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply
it."'" The Court concluded that no extraordinary circumstances warrant-
ing equitable relief were present.' 68 Additionally, the Court concluded,
without explanation, that even if the district court had found the chal-
lenged statute to be within the "patently and flagrantly" violative excep-
tion,'" such a determination would be unwarranted in light of other Su-
preme Court cases dealing with attachment proceedings. 178
 As to the
adequacy of the state proceedings to entertain the plaintiffs' due process
challenges, the Court found the issue "too laden with local law" to be ruled
on in the first instance in the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Court re-
versed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a de-
termination of the adequacy of the state proceedings."'
Justice Blackmun, concurring with the majority, maintained that the
application of the Younger doctrine hinges on the substantiality of the state's
interest in continuing its own proceedings free from federal interfer-
ence.' 72
 This state interest, Justice Blackmun suggested, is then' balanced
against the competing federal interest in exercising otherwise proper fed-
eral jurisdiction.'" He also contended that in applying this balancing test,
federal courts should focus upon the importance of the state interest in-
volved in the proceeding rather than the type—civil or criminal—Of the
proceeding, in determining whether federal injunctive relief is permissi-
ble.'" Applying these considerations to the facts presented in Trainor, Jus-
tice Blackmun pinpointed the presence of Illinois as a party acting in its
sovereign capacity, the state's option to proceed civilly or criminally against
the federal plaintiffs, and the importance to the state of maintaining the
fiscal integrity of its welfare program as requiring the conclusion that
Younger abstention was proper.'"
' 67 14 at 447 (emphasis added).
16 ' Id. at 446-47.
"" See text at note 144 supra.
170
 431 U.S. at 447. In support of this conclusion the Court posited, in a citation, a
comparison between North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (gar-
nishment statute permitting issuance of writ of garnishment by court clerk solely on basis of
conclusory allegations and without provisions for early hearing to determine validity of cred-
itor's allegations, struck down), and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (sequestration
statute upheld which allowed issuance of writ of sequestration upon showing of specific Facts
to a judge with provision for full hearing on issue of possession immediately following execu-
tion of the writ).
"' 431 U.S. at 447-48.
'" Id, at 448. Although he found Illinois' option here to pursue its interest either civilly
or criminally demonstrative of a substantive interest similar to that embodied in the criminal
and quasicrirninal proceedings of Younger and Huffman, Justice Blackmun contended that the
criterion for a grant of injunctive relief had consistently been the strength of the state's inter-
est at stake. As such, when the interest is slight as in Stefiel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)
(no pending state proceedings), the injunction will be granted, and when strong, as in
Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)(pending state proceedings to enforce statutes re-
lated to the state's criminal law), the injunction will be denied. 431 U.S. at 448-49.
"3
 431 U.S. at 448.
1 " Id. at 449-50. In concluding, Justice Blackmun argued that since that State's re-
coupment of mispaid welfare funds accrued to the benefit of all taxpayers, there was a valid
distinction between the State and private parties as creditors. Id. at 450.
"3 /d. at 449-50.
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, vigorously dissented' 76 on
grounds similar to those in their dissents in H/rffinan and juidice.'" Justice
Brennan maintained that section 1983 had the effect of radically altering
the allocation of federal and state responsibility for vindicating federal civil
rights. This reallocation, Justice Brennan contended, shifted the primary
responsibility for adjudicating claims under the Constitution and federal
laws to the federal courts and away' from the state courts.'" Denying in-
junctive relief against pending state civil proceedings in section 1983 suits,
justice Brennan maintained, patently violated Congress' purpose in enact-
ing section 1983.' 7"
Justice Brennan listed several reasons why it was inappropriate to
apply Younger principles to any state civil proceedings, including those in
Trainor. First, Justice Brennan noted'that the state's interest in protecting
the fiscal integrity of its welfare system was not significantly impeded by a
grant of injunctive relief, since the injunction merely prevented the state
from using an unconstitutional mechanism to obtain payment of an unse-
cured judgment. Moreover, the state's interest in securing such a judgment
was not, worthy of the deference due state criminal prosecutions."° Second,
Justice Brennan observed that the presence of a state as a plaintiff in the
suit did not merit the solicitude clue a state in the criminal context, since
the challenged attachment statute was available to private parties as well as
the state. There was consequently no reason to conclude that the state was
entitled to greater deference than that owed a private party.'"' Third, Jus-
tice Brennan suggested that. the primary justification for Younger was
founded in equity principles, which, because of a less compelling state
interest in continuing state proceedings, did not require a comparably rigid
rule against injunctive relief in the civil context.' 82 Finally, he argued that
the majority had taken the "patently and flagrantly unconstitutional" lan-
guage, cited in Younger, merely as an illustration of extraordinary circum-
stances justifying federal injunctive intervention, and "elevate[d] [it] to a
literalistic definitional status" which no conceivable statute could meet.'"'
' 7 " Id. at 450.
1 " juirlice, 430 U.S. at 341-47 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); Huffman,
420 U.S. 613-18 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
178 431 U.S. at 456.
'" Id. at 450-56, Justice Brennan viewed the Court's present limitation of the applicabil-
ity of Younger to state civil enforcement proceedings, on the basis Of federalism and comity,
merely as a signal for a complete extension to all civil litigation. Id. at 459-60.
'go Id. at 454. Justice Brennan argued that this was particularly true given the Court's
decision in Fuentes v. Silesia, 407 U.S 67 (1972), and Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405
U.S. 538 (1972). Fuentes involved a § 1983 suit challenging a state prejudgment replevin stat-
ute. The Court concluded that Younger principles did nut bar federal injunctive relief since the
injunction was not sought. against "any pending or future court proceeding as such ... [but]
only the summary extra-judicial process of prejudgment seizure of property to which [the
plaintiffs] had already been subjected." 407 U.S. at 71 n.3. Lynch involved a 1983 challenge
to a summary pre-judgment garnishment statute. The Court in Lynch found unpersuasive an
argument, based on 2283, that injunctive relief should be denied on the ground that inter-
ruption of the garnishment proceedings would substantially interfere with underlying civil
suits. 405 U.S. at 554-55.
"" 431 U.S. at 455.
192 /4. at 455-56.
"'Id. at 457.
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Justice Stevens dissented, in a separate opinion,'" contending initially
that the majority's opinion added unwarranted complexity to the Younger
doctrine. 185
 Justice Stevens, as had Justice Brennan, took issue with the
Court's strict interpretation of the "patently and flagrantly unconsti-
tutional" exception language, arguing that the Court's construction requir-
ing unconstitutionality in "every clause" had the practical effect Of elminat-
ing the exception.'" Next, Justice Stevens maintained that the majority's
holding hinged on the fact that Illinois was a party to the challenged pro-
ceedings, with the unjustified result that the majority paid greater defer-
ence to a state's status as creditor than to its interest in the integrity of its
judicial proceedings. This result, Justice Stevens suggested, was contrary to
notions of fecleralism.' 87 In the same vein, Justice Stevens observed that the
Court had fashioned a nonstatutory'doctrine of abstention which granted
greater deference to the state as a judgment creditor than Congress had
granted to the state as a collector of taxes.' 88 Although he agreed that un-
warranted interference with state litigation is uncalled for, Justice Stevens
argued that the standard of federal court deference to a state acting as a
judgment creditor should be no higher than that afforded by Congress to a
state collecting taxes.' 89 Finally, Justice Stevens maintained that the plain-
tiffs clearly did not have an adequate forum for vindicating their federal
rights in state court since the Illinois statute allowed a challenge to the pro-
ceedings only through a motion testing the sufficiency of the facts alleged
in securing the attachment.'" Justice Stevens thus concluded that Younger
abstention was patently inappropriate in Trainor because the availability of
an adequate remedy at law in the state forum was nonexistent or, at best,
uncertain.' 91
II. THE CHANGING RATIONALE FOR YOUNGER ABSTENTION
The majority opinions in Juidice and Trainor have implications both
for the type of state proceedings which merit Younger abstention and for
the range of equitable circumstances which stay the operation of the doc-
trine. The conclusion that the label on a state proceeding, whether civil,
criminal or quasicriminal, no longer should be determinative of the applica-
tion of Younger abstention' 92 implies that Younger protection is potentially
available for a wide variety of state proceedings, despite the Juidice-Trainor
Court's express reservation of the question of extending Younger to all
pending state civil litigation.'" Moreover, although the Court consistently
"4 Justice Stewart also dissented with the statement that he was in substantial agreement
with the dissenting opinions of both Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens. Id. at 448.
18 ' Id. at 460.
"9 Id. at 461-63.
"7 Id. at 464.
'" See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
"9 431 U.S at 464-66.
' 9 ° Id. at 466-69, 467-69 nn.12-15.
' 9 ' Id. at 469-70, 469 n.15. Justice Stevens suggested that when the constitutionality of a
state procedure was challenged, the procedure for determining the validity of such claims
must be clearly independent of that challenged, to be considered an adequate remedy preclud-
ing federal jurisdiction. Id. at 469 n.15. See text at notes 271-75 infra.
' 92
 Trainor, 431 U.S. 434, 444; Juidice, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36.
'P 3 431 U.S. at 444-45 n.8; 430 U.S. at 336 n.13.
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has maintained that Younger, even where otherwise applicable, will not
apply in the absence or an adequate remedy for the protection of federal
claims in state court or in the presence of "extraordinary circumstances"
leading to great, immediate and irreparable injury to the potential federal
plaintiff,'" the Juidice-Trainor Court's cursory examination or the adequacy
of state proceedings''''` and strict interpretation of "extraordinary circum-
stances" implies that the scope of these exceptions is being contracted.'"
Both the previous limitation of the Younger doctrine to state criminal
proceedings and the exceptions to the operation of the doctrine had their
roots in equitable principles.'" The expansion beyond criminal proceed-
ings and the contraction of Younger exceptions together signal a shift in the
Court's rationale for Younger abstention. Increasingly, the Younger rationale
is based not on considerations of equity, comity and federalism, but upon
comity and federalism alone. The result of this shirt may well be an exten-
sion of the Younger doctrine, without exception, to all pending state pro-
ceedings.
A. The Pre - Juidice & Trainor Younger Rationale
The Supreme Court decisions in juidice and Trainor have removed the
barrier which restricted the application of the Younger abstention doctrine
to a state's interest in pending criminal 1 " 8 or criminally-related•" state
proceedings. 2"° The dispositive factor for the application of Younger, ac-
cording to the Juidice-Trainor Court, is whether the requested federal in-
junctive interference with a pending-state proceeding manifests "an offense
to the State's interest ... likely to be every bit as great as it would be were
[the proceeding] a criminal proceeding."2" Unfortunately, the Court's ex-
plication of this dispositive Factor is obscure, indicating only that the state
interests involved in the proceedings in juidice and Trainor are "perhaps ...
not quite as important as is the State's interest in the enforcement of its
criminal laws ... or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-criminal
proceeding ... ," but nonetheless important enough to prohibit federal in-
terference. 212 The Court failed, however, to indicate any other standard by
'" See, e.g., Trainor, 431 U.S. at 441 -43.
'" Trainor, 431 U.S. at 447; Juirtice, 430 U.S. at 336-37.
"fi Trainor, 431 U.S. at 446 -47; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 338.
1" See text and notes 20-22 supra.
"" Younger v. Harris. 401 U.S. 37.
191' Huffman v. Pursue, Lid_ 420 U.S. 592.
10" The decisions in Juidice and Trainor are by no means the first signal that a move to-
wards extending the Younger doctrine to civil proceedings was being contemplated by members
of the Court. In Mitchum v, Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Court found that § 1983 was a
specific exception to the anti-injunction-statute, the effect. of which was to remove that statute's
complete bar to injunctive relief in the presence of pending criminal or civil proceedings. Id, at
242-43. See text and notes 59.68 supra. 1to his concurring opinion in Mitchum, Chief Justice
Burger remarked that "[w]e have not reached or decided exactly how great a restraint is im-
posed by these principles on a federal court asked to enjoin state civil proceedings." Id. at 244
(emphasis in original). See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (effect of Sosna's failure to
appeal denial of suit for divorce in state court unresolved since Sosna and the state urged the
Court to proceed to the merits); Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333 (1974) (probable jurisdiction
noted to consider applicability or Younger to non-criminal cases unexercised when case was
remanded for consideration in light of subsequent state supreme court decision striking down
challenged statute on similar facts).
201 Trainor, 431 U.S. at. 443; juidite, 430 U.S. at 336, quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604.
2" Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444, quoting juidice, 430 U.S. at 335.
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which to ascertain whether a state interest is "important enough" to merit
Younger abstention treatment.'"
Since the Court failed to elucidate the standards to be used in evaluat-
ing Younger abstention claims, an independent analysis is required to de-
termine which state proceedings involve state interests important enough to
require a denial of federal injunctive relief under in/dice and Trainor. An
examination of the considerations which the Court found controlling in
Younger doctrine cases prior to Juidice and Trainor provides a starting point
for such an analysis. This examination reveals that four considerations have
been deemed dispositive in denying injunctive relief in earlier Younger doc-
trine cases," 4 in addition to the traditional equity doctrine that criminal
proceedings should not he enjoined. First, in all Younger cases beforefuidice
and Trainor, the state was present as a moving party with an exclusive right
of action.'" Second, the pre-juidice and Trainor Court was particularly con-
cerned with avoiding undue interference, by federal injunction, with pro-
ceedings involving the legitimate efforts of a state to obtain compliance
with state policies. 2 ° 6 Prior toJuidice and Trainor, this concern was limited
to the state's interest in enforcing its criminal statutes or statutes related to
its criminal laws. 2° 2
 However, the Court emphasized as a basis for this con-
cern that injunctive relief could cause undue interference with state ac-
tivities if the injunction resulted in extended delays in the enforcement of
state policies; in costly, duplicative litigation in state and federal courts; in
the inability of a state to regulate "socially dangerous or constitutionally
unprotected conduct;" or in the disruption of a state's legislative process. 2"
Implicitly, an injunction against a states's sole or most effective means of
enforcing important policies would constitute undue interference with state
activities.
A third consideration in determining whether federal injunctive relief
against a state proceeding could be granted prior to juidice and Trainor was
"'Trainor, 431 U.S. at 443-44:Juidiee, 430 U.S. at 335-36.
204 Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. But ,we Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604, where the Court states:
The component of Younger which rests upon the threat to our federal system is
... applicable to a civil proceeding such as this quite as much as it is to a crimi-
nal proceeding. Younger, however, also rests upon the traditional reluctance of
courts of equity, even within a unitary system, to interfere with a criminal pros-
ecution. Strictly speaking, this element of Younger is not available to mandate fed-
eral restraint in civil cases. But whatever may be the weight attached to this factor
in civil litigation involving private parties, we deal here with a state proceeding
which in important respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most
civil cases.
Id. at 604.
2" In state criminal proceedings, the state would commence the action as prosecutor.
See. e.g.. Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Huffman, the state had an exclusive cause of action
under the public nuisance statute. 0/110 REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.03 (Page 1971). Section
3767.03 provides in pertinent part that "[wlhenever a nuisance exists, the attorney general,
the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such nuisance exists, or any person who is a
citizen of such county may bring an action in equity in the name of the state ...." See aLro
Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Stipp. 757, 760 (N.D. 111. 1975).
2" Younger, 401 U.S. at 44; Hnffman, 420 U.S. at 604.
"'Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604.
2" Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 51-53. The Court feared that injunctive relief might strip
the states "of all power to prosecute even the socially dangerous and constitutionally unpro-
tected conduct that had been covered by the statute, until a new statute could be passed by the
state legislature and approved by the federal courts in potentially lengthy trial and appellate
proceedings." Id. at 51.
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whether the injunction would reflect negatively upon the state's ability to
provide a judicial forum competent to adjudicate constitutional objections
to the state's statutes and procedures.'" And fourth, preluidice and
Trainor, Younger abstention applied when continuation of the state proceed-
ings resulted in a benefit to the public welfare which outweighed the indi-
vidual defendant's desire for a federal forum. 21 " For example, if a federal
injunction against the enforcement of a state law stripped the state of all
power to prosecute a crime until a new law could be passed, and the state
enforcement proceeding provided an adequate forum for the defendant's
constitutional claims, Younger abstention would operate to protect the public
interest in preventing that crime by preventing federal disruption of the
state proceedings.'" Consequently, a determination whether continuing the
state proceedings produces a public benefit great enough to outweigh an
individual's right to a federal forum has been implicit in the Court's prior
determinations of the type of state proceedings which merit Younger absten-
tion.
The considerations suggesting the need for abstention in previous
Younger cases coexisted with certain equitable circumstances which would
cut off' the operation of the abstention doctrine. Under the Younger ration-
ale prior to juidice and Trainor, the absence in a state criminal enforcement
proceeding of an opportunity for the state defendant to raise constitutional
objections would allow a federal court properly to enjoin the state proceed-
ing.'" In addition to this equitable exception for failure to provide an
adequate forum for the defendant's constitutional claims, the preluidice
and Trainor rationale provided that the presence of "extraordinary circum-
stances" leading to great, immediate and irreparable injury to the state de-
fendant would allow the federal court to enjoin state proceedings otherwise
meriting Younger abstention. 213 In Younger, the Court offered as examples
of extraordinary circumstances: bad, faith or harassment by state prosecut-
ing officials in bringing actions with no expectation of obtaining con-
victions,'" a "patently and flagrantly unconstitutional state statute " 215 or
other unusual circumstances which the Court declined to specify.'" To
amount to "extraordinary," circumstances had to expose the state defen-
a" Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604; Steffel v. 'Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974).
21 " Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-46. This process has always included the requirement. that
the state defendant have an ;tclequate .opportunity to present his federal claims in the state
proceedings and that he be exposed to no greater burden than that imposed by the defense of
a single prosecution. Id.
2l'
	 at 51.
M id. at 47.
2 ' 3 /d. at 46, 53-54.
2 H Id. at 53. The Younger Court pointed to Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965),
as a case whose record sustained a finding of bad faith or harassment on the part of state offi-
cials. Younger, 401 U.S. at 47-49. In Dombrowski, the federal plaintiffs, a civil rights organiza-
tion and its officers, were threatened with criminal prosecution by state officials; their offices
were raided and records seized. Despite a state order quashing search and arrest warrants, the
prosecutor continued to threaten to prosecute. 380 U.S at 487-89.
215
	
U.S. at 53. The Court in Younger made it clear that the enforcement of a facially
invalid statute would be insufficient injury to sustain a grant of injunctive relief, overruling
the district court's interpretation of its ruling in Dombrowski. Ir1. at 50-53. See generally Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 YALE L. J. 1:103 (1977).
21 " Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. See generally Byrne v. Karalcxis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson
v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
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dant to great and immediate irreparable injury beyond that imposed by the
ordinary burden of defending in the pending state proceedings. 217
Federal court deference to state court proceedings pre Juidice and
Trainor thus operated to protect the limited state interest in enforcing crim-
inal law and policies. In this limited context, the Court appeared concerned
with avoiding undue federal interference with a legitimate state activity and
unnecessary negative reflections upon the ability of state courts to adjudi-
cate federal constitutional claims. These concerns, along with the presence
of the state as the moving party with an exclusive tight to act in the state
proceedings sought to be enjoined and the public benefit to be derived
from the continuation of the state proceedings, supported the Court's pre-
vious applications of Younger abstention. The limited equitable exceptions,
allowing a federal court to interfere with criminal enforcement proceedings
in previous Younger cases, reflected the importance of the states' interest in
the uninterrupted maintenance of these proceedings.
B. The Juidice and Trainor Rationale for Abstention
In Juidice and Trainor, the Supreme Court refined both the consid-
erations providing a basis for abstention and the equitable exceptions to
those considerations to encompass a broader range of state interests. The
change is apparent in the short shrift which the Juidice-Trainor Court gave
to the Younger doctrine's distinction between civil and criminal proceedings.
The application to Juidice and Trainor of the four considerations which his-
torically provided a basis for abstention will illustrate the thrust of the
present extension of the Younger doctrine. Likewise, the Juidice-Trainor
Court's handling of equitable exceptions to the abstention doctrine will
highlight the possibilities for the doctrine's operation. It will be argued,
however, that the Juidice-Trainor Court's treatment of the basis for Younger
abstention and of the equitable exceptions to the doctrine is vulnerable to
criticism in failing to provide a viable standard for the invocation of absten-
tion and in limiting the availability of exceptions to the doctrine once in-
voked.
1. The Basis for Younger Abstention
The Court in both Juidice and Trainor rejected the notion that applica-
tion of the Younger doctrine hinges on whether the state proceeding is civil
or criminal in nature.'" In Juidice, injunctive relief was sought against the
continuation of civil contempt proceedings. In determining whether these
state proceedings required Younger abstention, the Court found no connec-
tion between the state's contempt statutes and its criminal law. 2 " Similarly,
in Trainor, injunctive relief was sought against civil attachment proceedings
utilized by the state to assure the availability of funds to pay a future civil
judgment. In both cases, the Court dismissed, without discussion, any con-
tention that a dispositive factor in the application of Younger was an attempt
2"
 See text and note 29 supra.
2 " Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 334-35.
2 ' 9
 Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 958. The Supreme Court did not take issue with
this finding by the district court. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 333-34.
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by the state to enforce criminal or criminally-related statutes. 22° The "more
vital consideration" for the Juidice-Trainor Court. was comity, "that is a
proper respect for state functions... [and] the belief that the National Gov-
ernment will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways." 221 However, the
Trainor majority carefully pointed out that the state in that case had the op-
tion to vindicate the policies implicated in the attachment proceedings
through a criminal prosecution. 222 Thus, while a criminal or quasicriminal
proceeding no longer is necessary to invoke Younger abstention, the possibil-
ity of enforcing a state policy through a criminal proceeding may be one
indication of the importance of the state's interest in continuing its own
proceedings without federal interference.
The application to Juidice and Trainor of the four considerations
deemed clispositive in earlier Younger cases also demonstrates the change in
the Court's rationale for invoking Younger abstention. First, in pre-Juidice
and Trainor cases, the state was present as a moving party with an exclusive
right of action. In juidice, unlike previous Younger cases, the contempt pro-
cess was invoked by private creditors seeking to enforce judgment debts.
However, only the state through its courts could exercise contempt powers
over the defendant debtors. 223 As such, the state in juidice may be seen as
having an exclusive right of action in the contempt process similar to that
held by the states in previous Younger cases.'" In contrast, the state at-
tachment proceedings in Trainor could be used by any party, state or pri-
vate, to reach the funds of civil state delendants, 2 " a situation unlike pre-
vious abstention cases where the state was the moving party with an exclu-
sive right of action in the state proceedings, and unlike the state's exclusive
power to impose contempt sanctions in Juidice. However, the state initiated
the attachment proceedings in Trainor. The presence of the state in its
"sovereign capacity" as a moving party apparently led the Trainor Court to
determine that Younger abstention was warranted. 226 Viewed together,
Juidice and Trainor represent a shift from previous abstention cases in that
either an exclusive state right. of action in the state proceedings or the pres-
ence in the proceedings of the state in its sovereign capacity as a moving
party will require federal court deference to those proceedings. 227 The
220 Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444; fuidice, 430 U.S. at 335-36. This summary dismissal of a
distinction between the enforcement of criminal and non-criminal statutes ignored the empha-
sis placed upon equity's traditional noninterference with criminal proceedings as a reason for
denying injunctive relief in Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. However, such treatment was
foreshadowed by the Huffman Court's emphasis on comity and federalism over and above
equity, as the controlling principles counseling restraint in the gram of injunctive relief. 420
U.S. at 600-05.
221 Trainer, 431 U.S. at 443; juidiey, 430 U.S. at 334, quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 601,
quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
"'Trainor, 431 U.S. at 435-36, 444. Justice Blackmun, in concurrence with the majority
opinion in Trainor, maintained that the state's option of proceeding civilly or criminally effec-
tively demonstrated that the state's interest in continuing the attachment proceedings was "of
the same order of importance as the interests in Younger and Huffman." M. at 449.
223 fuidice, 430 U.S. at 335-36, 336 n.12.
"'See note 205 supra.
226 Id. at 439, quoting Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 760.
226 431 U.S. at 444.
22r
	 text at note 205 supra.
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pre Juidice and Trainor, Younger rationale would have required the presence
of both elements before invoking the Younger doctrine. Under the rationale
in Juidice and Trainor, proceedings initiated by private parties, but leaving
the state an exclusive right of action, and proceedings available to public
and private parties, but initiated by the state in its sovereign capacity, will
merit Younger abstention.
The second consideration in determining the need for federal absten-
tion in previous Younger cases was the necessity of avoiding undue interfer-
ence with legitimate state activities and with the enforcement of substantive
state policies. In this vein, the Juidice Court observed that enjoining the
contempt proceedings would cut to the core of a state's power to adminis-
ter its court system. 228
 This in turn would jeopardize the state's interest "in
maintaining respect for the action of courts, and of orderly jurisprudence,"
and in protecting state court orders and judgments from nullification. 229
Thus, a federal injunction against the Juidice contempt proceedings could
have resulted in delay in effectuating state court judgments and in the
elimination of the state's only means of punishing recalcitrant or disrespect-
ful state litigants. 230
 Consequently, under Juidice the second element of the
rationale for Younger abstention remains essentially the same as in previous
Younger cases.
The Trainor Court similarly found that enjoining the attachment pro-
ceedings would interrupt the vindication of "an important State interest;"
the interest in administering and safeguarding the fiscal integrity of its
public assistance prograrns. 23 ' In doing so, the Trainor Court reasoned that
it was proper to accord the state's decision to punish alleged welfare fraud
through a civil suit for recoupment of funds and an attachment of assets to
secure judgment in that suit, the same federal deference accorded a state
decision to institute a criminal prosecution for such an offense. 232
 The
Court reached this conclusion even though the injunctive relief in Trainor
would have interrupted only the attachment proceedings and not the state's
underlying civil suit. 233
 The Court maintained, however, that an injunction
would "confront the State with a choice of engaging in duplicative litigation
. or of interrupting its enforcement proceedings pending decision of the
federal court at some unknown time in the future," 234 and implied that the
federal action already had caused great delay in the state's enforcement ac-
6011. 2 " Nevertheless, in sharp contrast to the decisions in Juidice and in
other previous Younger cases, the Trainor decision failed to suggest that the
2" 430 U.S. at 335-36.
229 1d. at 336 n.12, quoting Ketchum v. Edwards, 153 N.Y. 534, 539, 47 N.E. 918, 920
(1897).
23° The reality of New York's inability to punish such state defendants is illustrated by
the New York City Sheriffs' Office refusal to serve show cause orders on husbands who failed
to make alimony payments following the federal district court's injunction against the en-
forcement of the New York contempt procedures. Affidavit in Support of Order to Show
Cause Staying Order Entered by United States District Court for Southern District of New
York at 4, Juidice, 430 U,S. 327 (1977). See note 353 infra,
23 ' 431 U.S. at 444.
2 " /d. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, maintained that "[Ole propriety of
abstention should not depend on the State's choice to vindicate its interests by a less drastic,
and perhaps more lenient, route." Id. at 449-50.
222
	 at 454 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
284
	 at 445.
234 Id. at 438-39.
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application of the Younger doctrine would cut off a state's only or most ef-
fective means of vindicating an important state policy.
As to the third consideration, an attitude of respect for the compe-
tence of state courts, the Juidice Court maintained, as the Court had in
prior Younger cases, that an injunction against the contempt proceedings
would reflect "negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce consti-
tutional principles."'" Similarly, the Trainor Court asserted, without expla-
nation, that an injunction against the attachment proceedings would reflect
negatively upon the stare's ability to entertain constitutional challenges to its
policies. 2 a' Thus, this element of the rationale for Younger abstention re-
mains unchanged from previous abstention cases.
The fourth consideration in pre Juidice and Trainor cases leading to
denial of federal injunctive relief was whether the continuation of the state
proceedings would result in a substantial benefit to the public welfare de-
spite the individual defendant's desire for a federal forum. The Juidice
Court contended, without mention, of the state defendants' attempt to
maintain a section 1983 federal suit, that the continuation of the contempt
proceedings would serve the overall public good. 23 g However, unlike previ-
ous Younger cases, the most immediate beneficiaries were the judgment
creditors, not the general public. In Juidice., the contempt sanctions were
imposed by the state, at the request of creditors, to protect purely private
judgMents. 2" The private parties in the proceedings therefore could derive
immediate and substantial benefits, the collection of judgments, by the con-
tinuation of such proceedings in state court. In contrast, the benefit of con-
tinuing the attachment proceedings in Trainor would accrue solely to the
state as a whole by protecting the integrity of the public welfare system. 2 "
Accordingly, although the derivation of a public benefit, from continuing
state proceedings sufficient to overcome a state defendant's request for ac-
cess to federal court remains an element in the Juidice and Trainor rationale
for Younger abstention, it appears that the benefits of a continued state pro-
ceeding no longer need flow exclusively to the public; rather, they may
inure to private parties.24 '
Reconciliation of Juidice and Trainor indicates when a federal district
court is required, under Younger principles, to abstain from enjoining a
pending state proceeding. Under the Juidice-Trainor rationale for federal
abstention, criminal, quasicriminaI and civil state proceedings may activate
Younger abstention in three different situations. First, federal abstention is
warranted when the state has the exclusive right to initiate and to act in the
2"" 430 U.S. at 336, quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604.
297 431 U.S. at 446. The Court did acknowledge that this is the result whenever a fed-
eral court enjoins a pending state court proceeding. However, it was the combination of this
negative reflection and the possibility of disrupting state proceedings brought by a state in its
sovereign capacity that required Younger abstention. Id.
229 430 U.S. at 336 n.12.
239 Under N.Y. jun. LAW. § 773 (McKinney 1968), any fines collected under the con-
tempt procedures were applied primarily against such private judgments.
" 11 431 U.S. at 444. justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, suggested that since
the recovery of welfare funds through the state's use of the attachment proceedings produces
a benefit to all state taxpayers, the continuation of the state proceedings may be viewed as
immediately benefical to the public interest. Id. at 450.
241 See text at notes 210-11 .supra.
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state proceedings sought to be enjoined. This is the case in a criminal pro-
ceeding and certain criminally related proceedings. Second, Younger absten-
tion is applicable when the state has the exclusive right to act in a proceed-
ing originated by private parties, as in a contempt proceeding. Third,
abstention is proper when the state has used proceedings available to any
private litigant to vindicate an important state policy. If the state appears in
such a proceeding, 242 the federal court must ascertain whether enjoining
the proceeding would interfere with an important state interest. approach-
ing the importance of the state's interest in enforcing criminal laws.
This apparent extension of the Younger doctrine to protect a broad
range of state interests from federal injunctive interference is one of the
most significant aspects of the Juidice-Trainor rationale. After this extension,
the basis for Younger abstention includes state proceedings enforcing crimi-
nal and quasicriminal statutes, proceedings requiring respect for state judi-
cial systems, and proceedings involving important state interests, of which
the fiscal administration of public welfare systems appears to be only one.
Furthermore, a federal court must consider whether an injunction will
delay the enforcement of state policies, involve the state in duplicative liti-
gation, prevent the state from regulating proscribed behavior, or reflect
negatively upon the state's ability to adjudicate constitutional claims. Finally,
for the Younger doctrine to apply, it appears that the primary beneficiary of
the continuation of state proceedings still must be the state itself, although
a direct benefit to private parties will not prevent a denial of injunctive re-
lief.
Juidice and Trainor thus have changed the circumstances in which the
Younger doctrine may be invoked successfully by a state in terms of the ca-
pacity in which the state must appear in the proceedings sought to be en-
joined; the extent to which interests other than the enforcement of criminal
laws merit federal deference; and the extent to which continuing state pro-
ceedings may directly benefit parties other than the state. As a result,
Younger abstention will no longer be limited to the state's interest in the en-
forcement of criminal laws and policies. Instead, state proceedings vindicat-
ing a variety of state interests will warrant Younger abstention in the future.
The Juidice and Trainor rationale for federal abstention is vulnerable
to criticism, however, in failing to provide discernable criteria by which to
judge which state proceedings vindicate an interest "important enough" to
trigger federal deference to state proceedings. While criminal or quasicrim-
inal labels previously applied may have been too limited in protecting legit-
linate state functions, they did have the virtue of providing an objective
standard for the federal district courts to apply when confronted with a re-
quest for injunctive relief. Juidice and Trainor have eliminated this standard.
Instead, Juidice, in focusing on the integrity of state judicial systems,
suggests that when traditional independent state functions 243 are being yin-
"2 But see Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L. J. 1103, 1 138 (1977) ("Juidice made clear that the
presence of the state is not a necessary condition for triggering the Younger bar.").
543 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (unique state functions
include the raising of income through taxation and owning a statehouse); Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297-99 (1993) (power of state to tax shall not be inter-
fered with so long as an adequate remedy for illegal assessment exists); Coyle v. Oklahoma,
221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) (establiihment of a state capital cannot be interfered with by Con-
gress).
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cheated in a state proceeding, a federal court should not interfere unless
the state proceedings are inadequate to adjudicate federal claims or unless
"extraordinary circumstances" are present in the state proceedings. Trainor
suggests a need for federal abstention from any proceedings in which a
state effectuates its policies for protecting and delivering governmental ser-
vices. 244 Both cases imply that the states' conduct, through litigation, of ac-
tivities particularly reserved to states will merit. Younger abstention. Thus,
the preservation of a state's ability to carry on traditional governmental
activities—the protection of its sovereignty—appears to be the essential
criterion for invoking Younger. 245
The concept of unfettered state independence in dealing with matters
particularly reserved to the states or "state sovereignty" has been invoked
most often against. federal interference with state functions when Congress
has attempted to exercise its constitutionally delegated powers to tax and
regulate interstate commerce 24° to the alleged derogation of the states.247
In the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the nature of state
sovereignty, National League of Cities v. Usery, 248 the Court struck down cer-
tain congressional amendments 24" to the Fair Labor Standards Act 25" which
imposed minimum wage and maximum hour requirements for all state and
local government employees. 25 ' The National League of Cities Court prem-
ised that Congress, even in the exercise of its commerce clause powers,
2" National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976).
245 Without specifically terming it state sovereignty, justice Black, in Younger, recognized
the necessity for unfettered state independence when dealing with activities particularly re-
served to the states. 401 U.S. at 44. In Younger, the state activity was the enforcement of crim-
inal laws, and in his discussion of "Our Federalism," Justice Black stated:
The concept (of federalism) does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights"
arty more than it Means centralization of control over every important issue in
our National Government and its courts .. , . What the concept does represent is
a system in which there is a sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though
it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always en-
deavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate ac-
tivities of the States.
Id. at 44.
2J6 U.S. CoNs'r. art. 1,	 8, cl. 1, 3.
2" See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery. 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (Congress
may not exercise its commerce clause power so as to interfere with essential state decisions re-
garding the conduct of integral governmental functions); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,
547-48 (1975) (federal regulation under commerce clause will be upheld when such regulation
does not infringe appreciably on state sovereignty and particularly where the effectiveness of
federal action would be seriously impaired without regulation); New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1946) (states are not immune from federal tax exacted equally from
private persons upon the same subject matter); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)
(power to locale seal of state government, to change that location and to appropriate funds to
do so are stale powers beyond congressional control).
24" 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2 " Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 9'3-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
250 29 U.S.C. §§, 201 et seq. (1970).
25 '426 U.S. at 851-52. The Court struck down the amendments on the grounds that by
interfering with the state's ability to structure employee-employer relationships, the
amendments would impair the state's ability to function effectively and independently within
the federal system. M.
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cannot interfere 252 with what the Court termed the states' sovereign power
to pursue, unfettered by federal interference, 253 the traditional and essen-
tial functions which "are typical of those performed by State and local gov-
ernments in discharging their dual functions of administering public. law
and furnishing public services." 254
This view of state sovereignty was echoed in the rationale of the re-
cent Younger cases. In Trainor, a federal injunction against the state's pend-
ing suit to recover welfare funds would have interfered with the state's
right to protect the fiscal integrity of its public assistance programs.'" An
injunction against the civil contempt proceedings in Juidice would have in-
terfered with the state's right to insure the integrity of its judicial system.'"
This approach is consistent with a state sovereignty rationale insofar as it
bars the federal courts from disrupting a state's furnishing of public
services—the administration of a welfare system—or a state's administra-
tion of public law—the integrity of a judicial system. Thus, the Juidice-
Trainor rationale for abstention is related to the Court's concept of state
sovereignty. If a pending proceeding in a state court legitimately protects a
state's functioning as a separate and independent government,257• Younger
seemingly will apply to protect that proceeding from federal interference.
Although the Court has stressed this concept of state sovereignty in
recent decisions, it has done little to define its parameters.'" The Court in
Juidice and Trainor similarly neglected to set forth any standard which dis-
tinguishes between those state activities which are essential or important
and those which are nonessential or unimportant. The Juidice-Trainor Court
required only that the state activity vindicated in continued state proceed-
ings be of "sufficiently great import" to merit abstention; not that the state
activity vindicated be as important as the state's interest in enforcing crimi-
nal laws or maintaining quasicriminal proceedings.'" That part of/it/dice
and Trainor which is predicated on the desire to avoid disruption of legiti-
mate state activities and disparagement of a state's ability to adjudicate con-
stitutional challengesu" fails to elucidate this requirement. Every federal in-
junction against any state proceeding necessarily will be disruptive and tend
to reflect negatively upon state courts.'" The only standard provided by
the Juidice-Trainor Court apparently is that a state must show that continua-
tion of pending litigation in its own court system is necessary to protect the
252 'Flie majority opinion, in a footnote, ominously stated:
We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks
to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted
it under other sections of the Constitution such as the Spending Power, Art. 1,
8, cl. 1, or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
"3 Id. at 854-56.
2541d. at 851.
Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444.
"" Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335-36.
257
 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851, 851 n.16.
25B Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L
REv, 1871, 1881-84 (1976) (criticism of lack of standard for determining important state inter-
ests in National League of Cities v. Usery).
259
 Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335-36.
2" See text at notes 206-09 supra.
2 " The Court admits as much in Trainor, 431 U.S. at 445-46.
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state's functioning as an independent government within the federal sys-
tem, despite the presence of federal claims in the litigation. If a state makes
such a showing, uncle!. the Juidice-Trainor rationale Younger principles will
require federal courts to defer to state courts. 262
Allowing the mere demonstration of an important state interest to be
sufficientto successfully invoke Younger abstention under the Juidice-Trainor
rationale parallels the showing of a legitimate state interest required to sus-
tain state economic legislation in post-1937 substantive due process cases.'"
In the economic due process cases, the Court has maintained that federal
courts are not in a position to make qualitative judgments about the state
interests pursued in economic legislation; 2" courts should not. substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the decision of states to enact and to
enforce such legislation. 265 Similarly, the juidice-Trainor Court, appears re-
luctant to impose any restrictions upon the degree of importance required
for a state interest. to merit Younger abstention. If the Court's deferential
view of the states' enactment and enforcement of economic legislation is
transposed onto the Court's approach to Younger abstention in Juidice and
Trainor, the result would be that the federal district courts cannot judge the
importance of the state's interest in continuing state proceedings. The fed-
eral courts would determine only whether the interest advanced in the
pending state litigation is within the legitimate purview of states. The end
result of the Juidice-Trainor rationale for abstention then would be that if
the state has any legitimate interest in continuing the state proceedings,
Younger abstention would require federal courts to defer to state courts.
Regardless of whether plidice and Trainor will prevent all injunctive
interference with proceedings involving state interests, the extension of
the Younger doctrine to protect a variety of state interests beyond criminal
proceedings will significantly increase the number of state proceedings
meriting federal abstention. Accordingly, the chances of obtaining access to
federal district courts once state proceedings have begun—even under sec-
tion 1983—will diminish.
252 431 U,S. at 444, 444-45 n.8.
2 " Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952); Lin-
coln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937).
2" For example, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S, 379 (1937), in which a
state minimmn wage requirement for women was sustained and .a previous Supreme Court
decision invalidating such regulations—Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)—
was explicitly overruled, the Court stated:
The [state] legislature had the right to consider that its minimum wage require-
ments would be an important aid in carrying out its policy of protection [for
women]. The adoption of similar requirements by many States evidences a deep-
seated conviction both as to the presence of the evil and as to the means adapted
to check it. Legislative response to that conviction cannot be regarded as arbitrary
or capricious, and that is all we have to decide. Even if the wisdom of the policy
be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the [state] legislature is en-
titled to its judgment.
300 U.S. at 399.
2" Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963).
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2. Equitable Exceptions to Younger Abstention
The Juidice-Trainer Court's view of the equitable conditions mandating
injunctive relief' when the Younger doctrine otherwise would apply empha-.
sizes the Court's solicitude for a state's desire to continue proceedings with-
out federal interference. In previous abstention cases, the equitable excep-
tions were the absence of an adequate remedy or the presence of ."extraor-
dinary circumstances" in the state court proceeding. 266 The juidice-Trainor
Court has contracted these exceptions by presuming the adequacy of state
proceedings and by narrowing the range of "extraordinary circumstances."
In examining the adequacy of state proceedings to entertain consti-
tutional and federal law challenges to state statutes and procedures, the
Court, in Juidice and in Trainor, acknowledged that the dismissal of a fed-
eral suit "naturally presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely
decided by a competent State [court] the federal issues involved." 267 The
majority opinions in both cases, while finding that the federal suits should
have been dismissed, addressed only cursorily the adequacy of the con-
tempt or attachment proceedings to decide competently the federal claims
sought to be presented.268 In Juidice, the Court required only that the state
defendants have an opportunity to present their claims, suggesting in a
footnote when that opportunity arose. The Court did not explore the
adequacy of the state procedures. 269 Likewise, the Trainor Court, noting
that "ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused with fair
and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal rights," 270 declined to
rule upon the adequacy of the attachment proceedings and instead re-
manded the issue to the district court."'
In contrast to the majority's refusal to examine or provide criteria for
determining the adequacy of state proceedings, Justice Stevens concurred
in the Court's judgment in Juidice on the grounds that the New York con-
tempt proceedings provided an adequate remedy at law for the potential
federal plaintiffs, 272
 and dissented in part in Trainor273
 on the ground that
the attachment proceedings effectively foreclosed any challenge to their
constitutionality in the state court. 274
 Both Juidice and Trainor involved chal-
lenges to state procedures themselves as opposed to the enforcement of a
substantive state statute. Under Justice Stevens' analysis, a challenge to state
procedures particularly requires an examination of the adequacy of the
state forum to entertain constitutional claims. Justice Stevens maintained
that in order to be adequate the state forum must be "sufficiently indepen-
"" See text and notes 20-22, 27-31 supra.
"7 Trainer, 431 U.S. at 441. See also Juidice, 430 U.S. at 336.37, 337 n.14; Kugler v. Hel-
fant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
"I' Trainor, 431 U.S. at 441, 447;Juidice, 430 U.S. at 336-37, 337 n.14,
22 430 U.S. at 337, 337 n.14. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the only "rele-
vant datum is that the due process contentions concerning ... counsel [assigned to the state
defendants], as with other contentions, could have been presented to the New York State
Courts by the same parties or their attorneys who, instead, chose to ignore the pending state
court proceedings by filing this suit in federal court." Id. at 337-38 n.15.
272 431 U.S. at 441, quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975).
27' Id. at 447.
272 430 U.S. at 340-41 (Stevens, J., concurring).
273 431 U.S. at 466-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 467.
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dent of the alleged unconstitutional procedure to judge it impartially and
to provide prompt relief if the procedure is found wanting." 275 The failure
of the majority, in both Juidice and Trainor, even to question the partiality
of the state courts for their own procedures, both disregards that part of
Younger v. Harris- which requires the presence of a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy for the federal wrong before abstention is merited, and
potentially decreases the circumstances in which exceptions to the Younger
cloctrine will be found.
More significant than the Court's unwillingness to examine particular
state proceedings is its attitude toward state court proceedings in general.
In both Juidice and Trainor, the Court held that the mere opportunity to
raise constitutional issues in a state proceeding requires the dismissal of sec-
tion 1983 suits276 when such proceedings would vindicate an important
state interest. 277 The Court's implication is that a decision in a state court
with a state appeal and possible Supreme Court review278 provides protec-
tion equivalent to that obtained in a section 1983 suit heard and decided in-
itially by a federal district court.279 with review in the federal courts. 28° This
2T' hi. at 469 n.15.
27" Justice Rehnquist stated infuirlicri
We must decide whether, with the existence of an available forum for rais-
ing constitutional issues in a state judicial proceeding, the United States District
Court could properly entertain appellee's § 1983 action in light of our decisions
in Younger and Huffman. We hold that it could not.
430 U.S. at 330.
justice White stated in Trainor:
[W]hen a suit is filed in a federal court challenging the constitutionality of a state
law under the Federal Constitution and seeking to have state officers enjoined
from enforcing it, should the federal court proceed to judgment when it appears
that the State has already instituted proceedings in the state court to enforce the
challenged statute against the federal plaintiff' and the latter could tender and
have his federal claims decided in state court?
431 U.S. at 440.
2" The court found the important state interest in Juidice to be the protection of the in-
tegrity of its court system through its contempt procedures. 430 U.S. at 335-36. In Trainer, the
state interest was the protection of the fiscal integrity of governmental service programs, 431
U.S. at 444,
Juidice, 430 U.S. 337 n.14. Supreme Court review of the final decisions of the high-
est state court is provided for in 28 U.S.C. 1257 (1970). The statute provides
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as fol-
lows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of' a treaty or statute of the
United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on
the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United
States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is spe-
cially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commis-
sion held or authority exercised under, the United States.
See generally C. WRIGHT, LAw of' FEDERAL. COURTS 535.49 (3d ed. 1976)(hereinafter WRIGHT).
2 " In addition to the Court's statement to this effect in Huffman, 420 U.S. 592, 610-11,
see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 928, 930 (1975).
28° Appellate review of district court decisions in the federal courts of appeals is gen-
erally by appeal following a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1291 (1970). Inter-
733
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
assumption, coupled with the Court's reluctance to examine the adequacy
of state proceedings, may render useless the exception to the Younger doc-
trine for failure to provide an adequate remedy for constitutional claims.
The Juidice-Trainor Court also took a narrow view of what constitutes
"extraordinary circumstances" warranting an exception to Younger absten-
tion. In Younger, the Court noted several examples of extraordinary cir-
cumstances."' In Juidice, the Court. recognized only two types of circum-
stances as constituting an exception to the Younger doctrine. These are state
proceedings conducted in bad faith or with intent to harass, and the en-
forcement of a statute flagrantly and patently violative of express consti-
tutional prohibitions "in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in
whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply
it. "282
 Although the Court in Trainor acknowledged in a footnote that other
extraordinary circumstances might exist, 283 the text of the opinion reviewed•
and rejected only the two types of extraordinary circumstances recognized
by the Juidice Court, and determined that abstention was proper. 284
The decisions inJuidice and Trainor clearly suggest that the Court, when
faced with what it views as an important state interest, is less inclined than it was
in Younger v. Harris to allow extraordinary circumstances, in addition to a bad
faith prosecution and the enforcement of a patently and flagrantly unconsti-
tutional state statute, to interrupt state proceedings. 285 The Juidice-Trainor
Court's disinclination to find extraordinary circumstances is illustrated by its
treatment of the Younger Court's exception for the enforcement of an unconsti-
tutional state statute. According to the Court in Younger v. Harris, a state statute
locutory appeals of district court orders to the courts of appeals are allowed under certain cir-
cumstances in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970). See generally WRIGHT at 504-512.
Direct review of district court decisions by the Supreme Court has been extretnely fim-
ited following the repeal in 1976 of the statutes requiring the convening of three judge district
courts. Direct review is still allowed where specifically called for by Act of Congress. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253 (1970). See generally WRIGHT at 212-15, 526-30.
Supreme Court review of' the decisions of the courts of appeals is provided for in 28
U.S.C. § 1254 "(1970). The statute provides
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil
or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree;
(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of' ap-
peals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States, but such appeal shall preclude review of writ of certiorari at the instance
of' such appellant, and the review of appeal shall be restricted to the Federal
questions presented;
(3) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any questions of
law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon
such certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require
the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.
See generally WRIGHT at 530-34. See text at notes 334-59 infra.
2 " 401 U.S. at 53-54. See text at note 28 supra.
"'Trainor, 431 U.S. at 446-47; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 338, quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at
611.
283
 431 U.S. at 442 n.7.
284 Id. at 446-47.
282 Juidire, 430 U.S. at 338. The Court's disinclination to accept additional extraordinary
circumstances seems to have initiated with the decision in Huffman. 420 U.S. at 611. But see
Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. at 125 n.4 (scope of exceptions to Younger doctrine left unde-
fined).
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"flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against.
whomever an effort might be made to apply it," was an example of a statute, the
enforcement of which would qualify a defendant for injunctive relief.'" Rely-
ing upon Huffman, •thejuidice-Trainor Court transformed what in Younger was
an illustration into a definition. Thus, a state statute, to be "flagrantly and
patently violative" of the constitution and to permit a Younger exception, must
meet that standard literally "in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in
whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it,"
or not at all. 287 Thus, the Juidice-Trainor Court restricted not only the types of
extraordinary circumstances which would allow federal injunctive relief, but.
also its interpretation of the categories of such circumstances remaining after
the most recent Younger cases. As a result, the usefulness of the extraordinary
circumstances exception for the enforcement of such a statute is.dubious after
Juidice and Trainor. 288
Although the Court recognized that the state interests which required
federal deference in Juidice and Trainor were less important than the state's
interest in enforcing criminal or criminally-related statutes,28 " the Court
2" 401 U.S.'at 53-54.
2" The Court. in Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444, as well as in Juidice, 430 U.S. at 338, cited
only to the portion italicized below of a Watson v. Buck quotation, and without the qualifying
language used by Justice Black in the Younger decision, 401 U.S at 53-54. The full quotation
from Younger is as billows:
There may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary ir-
reparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of
bad faith and harassment.
For example, as long ago as the Brick case, we indicated:
It. is of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly and patently vio-
lative ef express constitutional pwhibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph,
and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply
it.' Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
Other Unusual situations calling for federal intervention might also arise, but
there is no point in our attempting now to specify what they might be.
401 U.S. at 53-54 (emphasis added).
"'Trainer, 431 U.S. at 457-58 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J-., dissenting); id.at
461-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It also [nay he argued that the had faith prosecution exception
has limbed viability to provide an avenue to federal injunctive relief. Since Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court has consistently found district court records insuffi-
cient to show the presence of bad faith or an intent to harass on the part of state officials, See
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1975); Kugler v. Helfam, 421 U.S. 117, 123-29
(1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611-12 (1975); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77,
80-81. (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611,
617.22 (1968). But see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U,S. 705, 709-12 (1977) (threat of repeated
prosecution and effect of threat upon daily life sufficient to sustain a grant of injunctive re-
lief); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (federal injunction allowed against state
board of optometry on grounds of bias against the federal plaintiffs). See also Fiss, supra note
242, at 1115, 1115 n. 36.
In addition, Trainor appears to be one of only three cases in which district courts have
utilized the "patently and flagrantly violative of the constitution" exception to the Younger doc-
trine. The other two cases are Nihiser v, Sendak, 405 F. Supp. 482, 494-96 (N.D. Ind. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 976 (1976) (judgment granting injunctive relief vacated; case
remanded for reconsideration in light of Huffman) and McGuire v. Roebuck, 347 F. Supp.
1111, 1118-21 (E.D. Tex. 1972) ( municipal ordinance granting city manager excessive and
unrestrained authority to grant or deny parade permits flagrantly and patently unconsti-
tutional).
5" Trainer, 431 U.S. at 444; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335.
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made no concomitant adjustment in the availability of the equitable excep-
tions to the Younger doctrine to allow for less federal court deference to
state courts. Thus, instead of broadening the Younger exceptions to corre-
spond to the diminished state interest in continued state civil proceed-
ings,2 " the Juidice-Trainor Court narrowed the exceptions. Arguably, how-
ever, the level of federal deference to state proceedings should decrease as
the importance of the state interest at stake decreases. As a result, the
Juidice and Trainor Court's restriction of the equitable exception appears
inconsistent with the Court's emphasis upon comity and mutual respect be-
tween federal and state courts.
The Court's treatment of the equitable exception for state remedies
inadequate to deal with constitutional challenges to state law particularly ap-
pears inconsistent with the level of deference granted state interests in decisions
in which the Court has acknowledged that state interests of less importance are
being vindicated. Indeed, thejtadice-Trainor Court paid greater respect to the
state's maintenance of civil proceedings than Congress requires federal courts
to pay to proceedings vindicating state taxing powers."' Section 1341 of Title
28 requires a federal court to ascertain whether a state taxpayer has a "plain,
speedy and efficient remedy" under state law before dismissing a federal action
to enjoin the collection of state taxes.292 By contrast, although Trainor was
remanded for a determination of the adequacy of the state proceedings to
entertain federal clue process claims, the majority opinions in both Trainor and
Juidice leave undefined what constitutes an adequate state remedy, 293 and by
their tone presume that state remedies are adequate. 294 This disinclination to
inquire into the adequacy of state proceedings comports with the comity or
sovereignty rationale for abstention. It premises that an examination of state
court proceedings would not promote an atmosphere of "proper respect for
state functions" nor would it reflect positively "upon the state court's ability to
enforce constitutional principles." 295 The effect of this restriction of the
equitable exception for inadequate state remedies, like the similar restric-
tion of the exception for extraordinary circumstances, is to increase the
likelihood that state defendants will be unable to show circumstances man-
dating federal injunctive relief against state proceedings. Under Juidice and
Trainor, moreover, the instances in which abstention will be triggered have
increased substantially. The Court's contraction of the equitable exceptions
to the Younger doctrine indicates, as a practical matter, that the likelihood
of federal injunctive relief, once Younger abstention is triggered, is ex-
tremely low.
C. Implications of the Juidice-Trainor Abstention Rationale
The Juidice-Trainor Court's changing rationale for Younger abstention
suggests two potential end points for the future expansion of the Younger
doctrine; the first more immediate than the second. First, Juidice and Trainor
2"
 See text at notes 198-203 supra.
20'
	 at 464-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
222 See, e.g., Tully v. Griffin, 429 U.S. 68, 74-77 (1976).
2" Trainor, 431 U.S. at 447, 447, n.10; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 337.
2" Trainor, 431 U.S. at 441.
206 Juidice, 430 U,S. at 335, 336, quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 601, 604.
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arguably represent an imminent expansion of Younger abstention to protect any
state proceedings in which the state itself is effectuating state interests and
policies. Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of Trainor is the Court's
emphasis upon the presence of a state interest important enough to require
federal abstention, 2"" while positing the issue before it as
when a suit. is filed in a federal court challenging the constitutionality
of a state law under the Federal Constitution and seeking to have
state officers enjoined from enforcing it, should the federal court
proceed to judgment when it appears that the State has already
instituted proceedings in the state court to enforce the challenged
statute against the federal plaintiff and the latter could tender and
have his federal claims decided in the state court?"'
There is no mention in this framework of an important state interest. Indeed,
an argument that whenever a state commences litigation on its own behalf it has
an important state interest to vindicate is consistent with the Trainor Court's
holding that Younger principles are broad enough to apply to ongoing civil
actions "brought. by the State in its sovereign capacity Therefore, as long as
federal claims may be heard in the state forum, the federal courts have no right
to intervene in any state-initiated litigation.
The second end point for the expansion of the Younger doctrine
signaled in Juidice and Trainor is arguably federal abstention in the face of
all pending state litigation, including purely private litigation. 29" Presently,
the Court has disclaimed such expansion, 3" and there are factors in these
recent Younger cases which indicate that the presence of the state in the
proceedings is necessary to trigger Younger abstention. 3" Moreover, the
contempt proceedings involved in Juidice may in fact form a poor basis for
such a generalization. While not a part of the state's criminal process, they
lead to penal sanctions, which are rarely imposed except to further impor-
tant state interests. Although triggered by private parties, they do serve a
public interest in a smoothly functioning court system and in many re-
spects, are more akin to the public, prosecutorial, enforcement-oriented
proceedings which supported previous Younger dismissals of federal com-
plaints than to purely civil proceedings brought by a state. 302
Nevertheless, several aspects ofjuldice and Trainor suggest that the exten-
sion of Younger to all state proceedings merely has been postponed while the
seeds for such an extension are planted. An examination of the proceedings
protected by the Court's holding in Trainor provides a stepping-off point for
this analysis. The Trainor Court maintained that the availability of the attach-
ment proceedings to private parties had no bearing upon its decision to apply
Younger abstention since the state was the moving party in the proceedings
sought to be enjoined. 3 " 3 However, if a section 1983 suit were brought to
2" 431 U.S. at 444,.
297 Id. at 440.
"8 Id. at 444.
2"" Id. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 430 U.S. at 345 n. *(Brennan, J., dissenting);
Fiss, supra note 242, at 1138.
300 431 U.S. at 444-45 n.8; 430 U.S. at 336 n.13.
3" See text at note 228-230 supra.
X02 See text and note 205 supra.
"3 Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444.
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challenge an attachment, or other such proceeding to secure judgments and
property initiated by a private party under state statutes, 304 Younger would not
have required dismissal of the federal suit. 305 As a result, the Trainor Court
granted greater deference to the state's utilization of the attachment pro-
ceedings by ruling that Younger applied, than it would have granted to a
private litigant's use of the same proceedings. The Court thereby accorded
greater deference to the state as a creditor than to the integrity of its judi-
cial procedures for attachment. 3"" Given the Court's solicitude for state
interests, it is arguable that a future step will be to correct this inconsistency
and provide Younger protection to all state proceedings invoking state
power to expedite attachments, garnishments and the like.
The Court's decision in Juidice suggests, however, that an extension of
Younger to all state proceedings is possible. The Juidice Court took care to
highlight the importance of the state interest in the "regular operation of its
judicial system."3 ° 7
 In this light, the civil contempt proceedings in Juidice
merited Younger abstention because contempt sanctions serve an important
public interest—"the interest in maintaining respect for the actions of courts,
and of orderly jurisprudence." 3 " The Court found this state interest important
even though the contempt sanctions would never have been imposed had the
301
 Attachment, replevin, garnishment and other such statutory proceedings to secure
debts and property allow private parties to utilize state powers to reach the funds and prop-
erty of other private parties. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972). Even if writs and or-
ders arising out of such proceedings are not issued by state judges or court clerks, the service
of papers by deputy sheriffs will fulfill the under color of state law requirements of § 1983.
Lynch r. Household Finance Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1 1 11, 1112, 1115 (D. Conn. 1970), reversed
and remanded on other grounds, 405 U.S. 538. 541-42 (1972) (garnishment action commenced by
creditor's attorney in his capacity as a court officer). See text of § 1983 at note 3 supra. See,
e.g., Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 128-29 (E.D. Penn. 1971) ( issuance of replevin writs
by clerks of courts sufficient action under color of state law to sustain § 1983 suit challenging
replevin action between private parties).
3 " 5 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 71 n.3. Gf Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405
U.S. at 552-56 (§ '2283 did not bar a § 1983 suit brought by private debtor to enjoin the use of
garnishment proceeding by private creditors). The Court in both Fuentes and Lynch held that
the replevin and garnishment actions in those cases were not pending or future court proceed-
ings as such. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 71 n.3; Lynch, 405 U.S. at 553-56. As a result, neither
Younger-type abstention principles nor the anti-injunction statute required dismissal of the §
1983 actions. Id. See text of § 2283 at note 9 supra. The Court's holding in Trainor, implicitly
to the effect that the Illinois attachment proceedings were pending proceedings within the
ambit of Younger and § 2283, Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444, m4 have cut back on the viability of
that portion of Fuentes and Lynch. See 431 U.S. at 454 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dis-
senting). See also note 180 supra. This result would comport with the view of the dissent in
Fuentes. 407 U.S. at 97-98 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3" 431 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
It would seem rather obvious to me that the amount of money involved in any
particular dispute is a matter of far less concern to the sovereign than the integ-
rity of its own procedures. Consequently, the fact that a State is a party to a
pending proceeding should make it less objectionable to have the constitutional
issue adjudicated in a federal forum than if only private litigants were involved. I
therefore find it hard to accept the Court's contrary evaluation as a principled
application of the majestic language in Mr. Justice Black's Younger opinion.
Id. (emphasis in original).
3G? 430 U.S. at 335. The Court re-emphasized the importance of this interest in Trainor
in the statement that "there are basic concerns of federalism which counsel against interfer-
ence by federal courts, through injunctions or otherwise. with legitimate state functions, par-
ticularly with the operation of state courts." 431 U.S. at 441.
3""Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335-36, 336 n.12, quoting Ketchum v. Edwards, 153 N.Y. 534,
539, 47 N.E. 918, 920 (1897).
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private parties injuidice not chosen to act for their own benefit."" This analysis
of contempt. proceedings, initiated by private parties for their own benefit and
resulting in sanctions that the state alone may order through its courts, provides
little basis for distinguishing purely private litigation, initiated by private par-
ties for their own benefit and resulting in judgments that the state alone may
issue through its courts. The rendering of judgments in private civil litigation
promotes a state interest in the "regular operation of its judicial system." If
contempt proceedings are to merit Younger abstention and if', at. bottom, the real
concern is to protect the vindication of any legitimate state interests, a strong
case may be made that 4fterJuidice and Trainor, the state interest in the regular
and uninterrupted operation of its judicial system will swallow up all other state
interests for Younger purposes. As a result, any state court. proceedings would
be protected from federal intervention regardless of whether the state is party
to the proceedings.
III. THE NEW ANTI-INJUNCTION RATIONALE AND SECTION 1983
A. The Effects of Juidice and Trainor on Section 1983
The curtailment of equitable conditions which allow federal injunctive
relief and the expansion in types of state proceedings which trigger Younger
abstention indicate that federal courts increasingly will be required to abstain
from enjoining a broad range of state proceedings—and possibly all state
judicial proceedings—involving federal claims otherwise properly before fed-
eral courts nuclei- section 1983. This extension is likely to have a number of
deleterious effects upon the viability of suits for injunctive relief under section
1983.
Initially, it may be argued that the Younger doctrine's ban on injunctive
relief now parallels the bar contained in the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2283. Section 2283 requires federal courts to deny requests for injunctive relief
against any pending state civil or criminal proceedings without regard to
equitable considerations unless the request falls within one of the three limited
exceptions to the statute. 3 '° juidice and Trainor approach section 2283's bar by
extending the Younger doctrine to numerous civil proceedings and by limiting
the equitable exceptions to the operation of the abstention doctrine. Thus, like
the anti-injunction statute, the Younger doctrine now operates to deny requests
for injunctive relief under section 1983 in the face of pending state criminal
and civil proceedings, notwithstanding the Court's holding in Mitchum v. Foster
that section 1983 suits fall within an express exception to section 2283. 3 " The
Juidice-Trainor extension of the Younger doctrine, by allowing the abstention
doctrine to swallow up the exception of section 1983 from the anti-injunction
statute, will close off access to federal court under section 1983 for many
potential federal plaintiffs who have been caught up in state proceedings. :112
"" See text at notes 238-41 supra.
31 " See text and mites at 32-52 supra.
3" 407 U.S. 225, 242-43. See text at notes 59-69 supra. In both juidice and Trainor, the
would-be federal plaintiffs failed to obtain federal relief under section 1983. Trainor, 431 U.S.
at 447-48; juielice, 430 U.S. at '334-36.
3" To the extent that the Younger doctrine may be applied where any civil suit is pend-
ing in state court, it may close the federal courts to all such plaintiffs. As such the new ration-
ale of Younger abstention may nullify the holding of Mitchum. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 344-45
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
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As the Younger doctrine is expanded to cover state civil proceedings,
potential federal plaintiffs, seeking to challenge state statutes and proce-
dures in section 1983 suits, also will increasingly be barred from federal
courts in a squeeze between federal standing requirements and abstention
principles. In Younger v. Harris, the Court refused to entertain a request for
injunctive relief from plaintiffs who were not yet involved in a state pros-
ecution, 3 " stating that "[a] federal lawsuit to stop a prosecution in a state
court is a serious matter. And persons having no fears of state prosecution
except those that are imaginary or speculative are not. to be accepted as ap-
propriate plaintiffs in such cases.'" While subjection to a state proceeding
will satisfy standing requirements, 3 ' 5 the Juidice Court was quick to note
that by such subjection the requirements for the invocation of Younger also
are satisfied. As a result, no injunction may issue, and the federal court is
required to dismiss the section 1983 action. 3 " Accordingly, to challenge
successfully state procedures or the enforcement of a state statute, a pros-
pective section 1983 plaintiff must show that he is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the result of state action and that the
feared state action, a state proceeding, has not yet begun. 3 " Recent Su-
preme Court cases have indicated how difficult such a showing may be. In
O'Shea v. Littleton, 3 " the Court denied section 1983 plaintiffs standing and
suggested that specific state actions must be alleged. Past exposure to al-
legedly illegal conduct would not establish the existence of a present case or
controversy meriting injunctive relief.319 Thus, although Vail, one of the
plaintiffs in Juidice, had failed to satisfy the underlying money judgment
against hitn, 321' and as a result potentially could be subjected continually to
the contempt process until the judgment was paid in full, he was denied
standing to sustain a section 1983 suit. The Juidice Court maintained that.
"standing cannot be based on such speculative conjectures which are
neither alleged nor proved."32 ' The Court's construction of the require-
ment that state proceedings be imminent to establish standing leaves only a
narrow time frame during which section 1983 suits may be brought before
Younger abstention is triggered. The expansion of the Younger doctrine to
state civil proceedings thus has the effect of increasing the circumstances in
which potential section 1983 plaintiffs will be denied access to federal
courts in a squeeze between standing and abstention principles.
313
 401 U.S. 37. 41-42.
" 4 Id, at 42.
315
 Juidice, 430 U.S. at 333.
3 ' 6 1d. at 331-33. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1977); O'Shea v.
Littleton,.414 U.S. 488, 496-97 (1974). See also note 110 supra.
317 See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494-98 (1974).
3"
 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
"9 1d. at 495. See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26,
37-39 (1976) (unless plaintiff makes adequate showing that an injury may be redressed by a
favorable decision, a federal court may not exercise its powers); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973) (plaintiff unable to show direct injury as result of enforcement of
criminal child support laws).
"" See text and notes at 86-94 supra.
3"
 430 U.S. at 433, 433 n.9. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 126-27 (1973) (doctor cur-
rently subjected to a state criminal prosecution denied standing to challenge state statutes as a
potential defendant in future prosecution for violation of state abortion laws).
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The application of the Younger doctrine in the civil area particularly
restricts the ability of low income federal plaintiffs—such as those inJuidice and
Trainor—to obtain redress of federal rights in federal court under section 1983.
Low income people are ()lien defendants in state garnishment, attachment and
contempt proceedings of the type used in Juidice and Trainor to secure judg-
ment debts. 322 It is unlikely that. such potential federal plaintiffs would have
standing to challenge the procedures in such garnishment, attachment and
contempt proceedings until the proceedings have actually begun." 2" Moreover,
since these proceedings are regarded generally as continuing under state law, it
is possible, under Huffman'.s requirement that state appellate remedies be
pursued once state proceedings have begun, 324 that low income state defen-
dants will be unable to bring challenges to state procedures in a federal district
court.325 Since the poor are often caught up in state proceedings before they
are even aware of their federal rights, the Juidice-Trainor extension of the
Younger doctrine arguably diminishes the availability of section 1983 suit for
parties in the greatest need of aid from the federal courts. 326
Finally, the effect of the Younger doctrine upon section 1983 suits is
magnified by the Court's willingness to allow states to cut off intentionally
section 1983 actions. In Hicks v. Mirando, 327 the Court held that Younger a listen-
don requires dismissal of a section 1983 complaint if state criminal proceedings
are commenced against the federal plaintiff prior to the commencement of
substantive proceedings 32" on the merits in the district court. 32" The probable
result of the Hicks decision is that in order to secure the dismissal of a section
1983 challenge to its actions, a state need only commence proceedings in its own
322 The Civil Rights Improvements. Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 35 Befbre the Subcomm. on Con-
stitution al .
 the Senate Conon. on Judiciary, 92d COng., 2d Sess. (1978) (statement of Legal Services
Attorney Working Group at 6, Feb. 9, 1978) (hereinafter Legal Services).
323 Legal Services„mpra note 322, at 6-8.
324
 See text at notes 79-83 supra.
3" Legal Services, supra note 322, at 7.
326 In its testimony on Senate Bill No. 35, the Legal Services Attorney Working Group
stated:
For the poor, access to federal court is not an abstract issue concerning the
proper allocation of judicial power within our federal system. Access to federal
court often is the only means by which the poor can assert their rights to decent
housing, to a job, to adequate public assistance, to health care, and to freedom
from discrimination on the basis of race, sex and national origin.
Legal Services, supra note 322, at 1.
327 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (White, J., writing for five-man majority).
326 422 U.S. at 349. While the Court was unclear as to what would constitute "substan-
tive proceedings on the merits," it did state that in the Hicks case, no answer had been filed to
the federal complaint. Id. at 349-50.
326 Prior to Hicks, in the decision of Stale! v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the
Court unanimously held that Younger principles of equity, comity and federalism did not pre-
clude federal equitable relief' when a mate prosecution was threatened but Hot yet begun. Id. at
461-63.
The Hicks decision disrupted the holding in Steffel in two ways. First, when a federal
plaintiff is joined as a defendant in a state prosecution before the commencement of substan-
tive proceedings on the merits in the district court, the federal complaint is required to be
dismissed. 422 U.S. at 349-50. Second, the Court seemed to indicate that even if' the federal
plaintiff is not a party to state proceedings, if he has a substantial interest in the state prix:eed-
ings such that his federal suit would disrupt a pending proceeding, the federal complaint must
be dismissed. Id. at 348-49.
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courts."' The viability of a section 1983 suit, thus depends upon the state's
choice of foru M . 33
 I f the state desires to utilize its own courts it may commence
a proceeding protected from federal interference—literally upon the notice
provided by the service of the federal complaint—'and retain jurisdiction over
all. claims. As a result, the Juidice-Trainor Court's. expansion of the Younger
doctrine operates both to deny injunctive relief despite the provision of a suit in
equity against state deprivation of constitutional rights in section 1983, and to
allow the state—the party alleged to have infringed constitutional rights in a
1983 suit—to dismiss section 1983 actions by initiating its own proceedings.
B. The Conflict BetweenJ uidice-Trainor and Congressional Intent in Section 1983
The Juidice-Trainor Court's broad interpretation of the state interests
which invoke Younger abstention shuts off access to federal courts of many
cognizable section 1983 claims. The Court's strict definition of the equitable
exceptions to the Younger doctrine expedites this result. However, neither the
Trainor nor the Juidice majority opinion discussed the impact of their holdings
upon the congressional concerns embodied in the constitutional causes of
action provided in section 1983. 332
1. The Historical Intent of Section 1983
Examination of the legislative history of section 1983 indicates that
the decisions in Juidice and Trainor are contrary to the congressional pur-
pose in enacting that statute. Section 1983 has remained virtually un-
changed from the original form in which it was enacted as section one of
the Ku Klux Klan Act,333
 a statute designed "to protect all persons in the
United States in their civil rights and to furnish the means of their vindica-
tion."334
 The Ku Klux Klan Act was particularly directed toward curbing
the violence being visited upon emancipated slaves and Union sympathizers
3" Id. at 355-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The would-be federal plaintiff in Hicks,
Miranda, owned a theater at which allegedly obscene films were being shown. Two of his
employees were arrested and the films were seized. Subsequently, a prosecution was com-
menced against the employees. Id. at 334.39. Miranda was joined as a defendant in the state
proceeding one day after the service of his federal complaint on state officials. Thus, even
though Miranda was not a party to the state proceeding at the time of filing his federal com-
plaint and although initially only his employees were being prosecuted, the federal district
court was not allowed to entertain his request for injunctive relief under section 1983. Id. at
348-49.
331 In contrast, in Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471
(1977), decided the same day as Trainor, a unanimous Court held that a federal court must
honor a state's choice to remain in the federal forum even though Younger principles might
otherwise require that court to abstain. 431 U.S. at 479-80 (Rehnquist, J., did nut take part).
The Hodoty Court stated:,
If the state voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity
do not demand that the federal court force the cases back into the State's own
system .... [Milder these circumstances Younger principles of equity and comity
do not require this Court to refuse [the state] the immediate adjudication it seeks.
Id. at 480. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 396 n.3.
333
 Bat see Trainor, 431 U.S. at 450-60; faidice, 430 U.S at 341-47; Huffman, 420 U.S. at
613-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
333
 Act of April 20, 1871, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The statute was
enacted to aid in the enforcement of the recently adopted fourteenth amendment. See Devel-
opments in the Law—Section IWO and Federalism, 90 HARP. L. REV. 1133, 1141-56 (1977).
3" Act of April 20, 1871, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 22, 17 Stat. at 13.
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in the South by organizations such as the Klan. 335 One congressional con-
cern was the failure of southern courts to prosecute and obtain convictions
of perpetrators of violence whose actions deprived their victims of consti-
tutional rights. 3 " Although section one was one of the least controversial .
provisions337 of the bill, congressional opponents of the measure contended
that relief for the deprivation of constitutional rights in a federal trial court.
was unnecessary in light of adequate state remedies. 3 "8 argued that
any state judicial enforcement of an. unconstitutional state law could be de-
clared void upon review by the Supreme Court. 339 Proponents of the mea-
sure responded by emphasizing the necessity of protecting constitutional
rights and pointing out the inadequacy then exhibited by state courts in
dealing with violations of such rights. 3 ' Significantly to the Younger doc-
trine, these arguments indicate that the supporters of section 1983 in-
tended the provision to provide a cause of action very different from the
relief available in state proceedings subject to Supreme Court review."'
3" The Ku Klux Klan Act was enacted in part in response to a message from President.
Grant to the Congress on March 23, 1871 requesting legislation to deal with the rising tide of
violence in the south. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1871).
33" See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (187.1) (remarks of Sen. Osborn).
337 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Frelin-
ghuysen). See note 341 infra.
33" See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Kerr). In op-
position to the bill, Mr. Kerr stated:
This section gives to any person who may have been injured in any of his rights,
privileges, or immunities of person or property, a civil action for damages against
the wrongdoer in the Federal courts. The offenses committed against him may
be the common violations of the municipal law of his State.... It is a covert at-
tempt to transfer another large portion of jurisdiction from the State tribunals, to
which it of right belongs, to those of the United States.
33" Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Blair). Senator Blair
stated:
This being forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, and all the judges,
Stale and national, being sworn to support the Constitution of the United States,
and the Supreme Court of the United States having power to supervise and cor-
rect the action of the State courts when they violated the Constitution of the
United States, there could be no danger of the violation of the right of citizens
under color of the lows of the States.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
34° See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 577 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Carpenter).
Senator Carpenter stated:
Under the present Constitution, however, in regard to those rights which are se-
cured by the fourteenth amendment, they are not left as the right of the citizen
in regard to laws impairing the obligation of contracts was left, to be disposed of
by the courts as the cases should arise between man anti man, but Congress is
clothed with the affirmative power and jurisdiction to correct the evil. 1 think
there is one of the fundamental, one of the great, the tremendous revolutions ef-
fected in our Government by that article of the Constitution. It gives Congress
affirmative power to protect the rights of the citizen, whereas before no such
right was given to save the citizen from the violation of his rights by State Legis-
latures and the only remedy was a judicial one when the case arose.
31 ' Id. at 501 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen). Senator Frelinghuysen stated:
As to the civil remedies, for a violation of these privileges, we know that when
the courts of a State violate the provisions of the Constitution or the law of the
United States there is now relief afforded by a review in the Federal courts. And
since the 14th amendment forbids any State from making or enforcing any law
abridging these privileges and immunities, as you cannot reach the Legislatures,
the injured party should have an original action in our Federal courts, so that by
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Moreover, Congress recognized that the legislation might result in federal
courts properly assuming jurisdiction over suits in which state relief might
also be available. 342
The legislative history of section 1983 clearly demonstrates that Con-
gress was cognizant that ultimate review by the Supreme Court of state court
decisions was available in cases where a remedy for the deprivation of consti-
tutional rights was sought. Nevertheless, in choosing to provide a civil remedy
for the deprivation of federal rights in federal court, Congress implicitly
expressed the belief that federal remedies would be superior to state remedies.
The Court's conclusion that a hearing in state court with the possibility of'
review in the United States Supreme Court is equivalent to an initial hearing in
a federal district court, is simply contrary to the legislative history of section
1983.
2. Present-Day Considerations.
Several considerations suggest that the congressional conclusion that state
court adjudication of constitutional issues does not provide the protection
obtainable in federal courts, is still valid. Considerations which favor having
federal district courts adjudicate constitutional claims may be grouped into
three general categories: (1) federal procedural safeguards; (2) the expertise
and tenure of federal judges; and (3) the speed and type of relief available in
federal district courts. First, relegating would-be federal plaintiffs to state court
hearings deprives a constitutional litigant of the benefits of federal trial proce-
dures. These include discovery, class actions, liberal joinder rules and broad
personal service; 343 devices which frequently are not available or are more
restricted in state courts. Moreover, these procedures are an important tool in
constructing a full factual record for review on appeal, since fact findings made
at trial often will dictate the decision of federal claims.'" The possibility of a fair
or successful review of' an individual litigant's constitutional claims thus may
have been lost long before review in the United States Supreme Court is
reached.
Another issue which contributes to the success or failure of the assertion
of federal claims is the environment in which the federal claims are heard. In
injunction or by the recovery of damages he could have relief against the party
who under color of such law is guilty of infringing his rights. As to the civil rem-
edy no one, 1 think, can object.
See also note 339 supra.
3"
 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Arthur). Rep. Arthur
contended that the bill would "absorb the entire jurisdiction of the States over their local and
domestic affairs." See also note 338 supra. Additionally, within four years of the passage of the
predecessor of section 1983, Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1875, which successfully
granted original federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts for suits arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Act of March 3, 1875, 43d Cong., 2nd Sess. ch.
137, 18 Stat. 470. The vast power granted to the federal judiciary by this Act affirmed the in-
tent of Congress to make the federal courts the primary forum for vindicating federal rights.
This intent continues to be evident in the language of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), in which
Congress has granted original federal question jurisdiction and jurisdiction for causes of ac-
tion for the deprivation of civil rights to the federal courts. See note 31 supra.
"3 FED. R. Civ. P. 4, 18-21, 23, 26-34.
3 " "It is the typical, not the rare, case in which constitutional claims turn upon the reso-
lution of contested factual issues." England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
416-17, quoting Townsend v. Salo, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
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state proceedings, the enforcement of a state statute or procedure naturally will
be spotlighicd." 45 As a result, the assertions of federal rights may be over-
shadowed." 4" In section 1983 suits, however, federal challenges to state actions
are the sole issues before the federal district court. Thus, a state court, primarily
concerned with state interests, simply may not constitute a forum in which
consideration of federal issues will be equivalent to that possible in a fed-
eral district court.
The conclusion that federal courts are more appropriate forums than
state courts for adjudicating federal claims stems secondly from the greater
expertise of district court judges in questions of constitutional and federal
law.a 47 In addition, the appointment and life tenure of federal judges, as
opposed to the selection of state judgeS most of whom are elected or appointed
and may be removed,346 may ease the making of unpopular or controversial
constitutional decisions.aat' This may be particularly true when such a judge
renders a decision striking clown an existing state statute or requiring an
injunction against state or local officials. A federal district court judge would be
more insulated from the results of a constitutionally necessary but practically
disruptive decision than would be a state court judge. The state judges in
New York after the district court decision in Juidice, for example, would
have been required to deal directly with the temporary lack of procedures
for civil contempt." 5 "
3" Trainor, 431 U.S. at 446Juidiee, 430 U.S. at 335-36.
31"
	 allowing Supreme Court review of state court decisions upholding the consti-
tutionality of state statutes by appeal rather than by certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, Con-
gress arguably acknowledged the premise that state courts may favor the validity of their own
laws.
3" Other factors contributing to a better qualified federal judiciary may include:
(1) the federal bench is chosen from a smaller pool of legal personnel, making it easier
to maintain high levels of competence;
(2) federal judges are paid better, which in addition to the prestige of the federal
bench, may make a judgeship n o 	 appealing to highly qualified private practitioners.
Nettho rite. The Myth of Parity, 90 HAM', L. REv. 1105, 1121-24 (1977).
34" Three general methods for selecting state trial judges are currently used: appoint,
meat; election, either partisan or nonpartisan; and initial appointment followed by retention
election. See S. Escovrrz. JuoicrAr SELEcrioN AND TENURE 11-12 (1975). In four states, Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and New Jersey, trial judges are appointed with life
tenure. In addition, in New Jersey, such tenure is conditioned upon reappointment after
completion of a seven year term. Id. at 27, 31, 36. In four other states, trial judges are ap-
pointed for terms of four to twelve years followed by consideration for reappointment. Id. at
20, 22, 26. In the other 42 states and the District of Columbia, trial judges are either ap-
pointed or elected subject to retention elections at intervals from one to fourteen years. a at
17-42, This breakdown shows that in only four states do state judges enjoy the same insulation
from political pressures as is afforded federal judges,
"" It also may be suggested that the federal judiciary feels the weight of tradition in the
making or constitutional decisions far more strongly than state court judges. This attitude is
arguably buttressed by the greater certainty of supervision and review by the Supreme Court
for federal judges. Neuborne, supra note 347, at 112.1.
35" Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause Staying Order Entered by United
States 'District Court for the Southern District of New York on January 14, 1976 at 1-2, fuidice,
930 U.S. 327 (1977). In his request. for an order from the Supreme Court for a stay of the
order entered by the district court which invalidated sections of the New York law governing
contempt proceedings, New York Assistant Attorney General A. Seth Greenwald stated:
Unless some relief from the order is provided there appears to be no way the
courts of the State of New York can provide sanctions for civil contempt. While
the Legislature can act this can take time and in view of' the continuing fiscal
crisis, the drafting of a new Judiciary Law Art. 19 is not a top priority.
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A third factor favors the initial presentation of federal claims in fed-
eral court: rather than requiting constitutional litigants to go through state
courts. A federal trial may avoid the uncertainty, expense and delay pre-
sent in the state appellate process. These circumstances may render possi-
ble ultimate success after appeal far less valuable than a speedy adjudica-
tion at the trial level. A successful appeal to the United States Supreme
Court from state courts may never be achieved. 35 ' Moreover, even when
Supreme Court review is available, it may be too costly for those litigants in
greatest need of swift adjudication of constitutional claims. This was cer-
tainly the situation for the original plaintiffs who were respondents in
Juidice and in Trainor. The plaintiffs in Trainor were welfare recipients; the
plaintiff in Juidice, also a welfare recipient, had to borrow funds front a rel-
ative for the payment of the fine necessary to expedite his release from jail.
Parties, such as these, faced with the loss of all assets and with imprison-
ment, may be unable to afford the pursuit of state court appeals, particu-
larly if the chances for relief are low. 352 Finally, delays while in the pursuit
of a state appeal may render hollow any relief ultimately obtained. In con-
trast, there is the possibility of a swift remedy through the alternative of
federal injunctive relief. 353 For example, in Trainor, when the plaintiffs'
funds were frozen by the writ of attachment, they were required to and did
appear in state court two weeks later, only to be told that. their hearing had
been continued for another month. 354 Facing pending rent and car repair
bills, and past due electricity, gas and telephone bills, the Trainor plaintiffs
filed their section 1983 complaint in federal district court. 355 That court
ordered the release of one half of the attached funds at a time when relief
in the state court was speculative at best. 356
The Juidice-Trainor Court's assumption of the equivalence of state and
federal remedies buttresses its decision to return section 1983 plaintiffs to state
proceedings. According to the Court, considerations of comity and federalism
require this result. The legislative history of section 1983 indicates, however,
that despite the availability of state forums federal courts would he deemed the
Greenwald included as an exhibit to his affidavit an article from the New York Law
Journal to the effect that following the invalidation of the contempt procedures, the New
York City Sheriffs Office had begun to halt the enforcement of civil contempt orders jailing
husbands who were in arrears on alimony and support payments. Sheri/J- 10 Halt Efforts to Jail
Husbands Who Owe Alimony, New York Law Journal, Jan. 12, 1975 at
3"
 See text of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970) at note 278 supra. A decision of the federal dis-
trict court may also fail to be reviewed by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. However,
at this point the litigant has already had the advantage of a hearing in the federal district
court, unlike the state defendant who is required to remain in the state court system only to
be refused entrance to the Supreme Court.
Sax
	 plaintiffs in both cases were represented by legal aid groups: in Juidice by the
Mid-Hudson Legal Service Project and the Greater Upstate Law Project; in Trainor by the
Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago.
333
 In addition, the 'remedies available for the deprivation of constitutional rights in a
federal district court are often different and more effective in redressing the deprivation of
constitutional rights than the remedies available under state law. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 196 n. 5. But cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12.
334
 431 U.S. at 451-52, 452 ri.3. •
333 1d.
3543 In fact, justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Trainor, contended that the
present Illinois proceeding would not have allowed Mr. & Mrs. Hernandez to raise their con-
stitutional objections at all. 431 U.S. at 468 n.14. See text at notes 272-75 supra.
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primary vindicators of federal rights. This decision of the drafters of section
1983 continues to - be supported by the present day considerations of federal
procedural safeguards, federal judicial expertise, and the speed and type of
relief available in federal as opposed to state courts.
C. Alternatives to the Present Extension of the Younger Doctrine
In light of the legislative purpose,underlying the enactment of section
1983 and the present day considerations supporting that purpose, the rigid
rule for the application of the Younger doctrine reached by the Court injuidice
and Trainor is contrary t o Congress' apparent intent that federal courts exercise
jurisdiction over cases involving alleged violations, through state action of
federal constitutional rights. Two alternatives - to the Court's approach inJuidice
and Trainor may be suggested.
The first alternative exhibits the benefit of hindsight. In considering a
request for injunctive relief against state civil proceedings, the Court could
have adopted a more flexible balancing approach. Under this approach, both
the federal court interest in exercising jurisdiction and the state court desire in
vindicating state interests in a state proceeding could be balanced."' An ac-
commodation of federal and state interests in entertaining litigation would
provide a middle ground between categorically placing federal claims in state
courts under the rubrics of comity and federalism, as the fuidice and Trainor
Court did, or ignoring the delicacy of federal-state relations by placing all
federal claims in federal courts regardless of a state interest in continuing
its own proceedings. Pertinent inquiries to be weighed on the side of the
federal interest in hearing the cases would include the adequacy of the
state proceeding to hear the federal claims, the relief available in the state
court proceeding, the importance of the constitutional claim raised, and the
potential irreparable injury to be suffered by the federal plaintiff if re-
quired to remain in state court. On the state's side of the balance, the con-
sequences of delay in the enforcement of state policies stemming from a
federal injunction, the availability of alternative methods of enforcing state
policies and the effect of a federal injunction upon the public welfare,
would be factors. An evaluation of which judicial system has the greater
stake in hearing a case, as opposed to the somewhat rigid Younger ap-
proach, would have the advantage of responding to fluctuating federal and
state interests in litigation. Given the disposition of the Court as manifested
in Juidice and Trainor, however, the prospect that such an approach will be
judicially adopted seems remote.
The second alternative to the Juidice-Trainor Court's methodology is a
prospective one. In response to the Court's recent curbs on the scope of
section 1983 through the extension of the Younger doctrine, an amendment
to section 1983,3 • 8 called the Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1977 or
Senate Bill 35, is presently being considered in the United States Senate. 359
"/ Such an approach is suggested by Justice Blacktnun in his concurring opinion in
Trainor, 431 U.S. at 448.50. See text and notes at 172-75 supra. See also National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"" S. 35, 95th Cong., lst. Sess. (1977).
"" See text and notes at 10-12 supra.
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S.35 would directly limit the Court's holdings in Younger v. Harris and its
progeny.'
S. 35 retains the Court's position in Younger v. Harris to the extent that in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances a pending state criminal proceed-
ings, commenced prior to the filing of a section 1983 suit, may not be enjoined
by a federal court." 6 ' However, the opportunity to be heard in state court would
have to include the chance to present every claim which could be raised in the
attempted section 1983 suit. 362 This requirement of a "full and fair opportun-
ity" to be heard on federal claims before injunctive relief can be denied would
overcome the present. Court's reluctance to examine the adequacy of state
proceedings. ' 113 In addition, the range of circumstances requiring injunctive
relief against state criminal proceedings, as delineated in the bill, differs from
that in Younger v. Harris and subsequent abstention cases. While retaining a
criminal prosecution commenced in bad faith or the enforcement of an uncon-
stitutional state statute as examples of extraordinary circumstances,u 4 the bill
would include the enforcement of state statutes which are facially unconsti-
tutional in whole or in part among the circumstances allowing a federal court to
enjoin state criminal proceedings. 365 This inclusion would directly overrule the
Court's refusal in Younger to allow such an exception." Finally, in response to
Hicks v. Miranda,'" the bill provides that a federal court may enjoin state
criminal proceedings if the latter were commenced after the filing of a section
1983 action."
S. 35 explicitly rejects the applicability of Younger abstention principles
to any civil or quasicriminal state proceedings. In so doing, the proposed
amendment to section 1983 would overrule the holdings of Huffmarijuidice
and Trainor for section 1983 injunctive suits. Section 2(g)(5) of the bill
3"" In addition, the bill would affect Pullman abstention. See discussion of this doctrine
at note 33 supra, The bill being considered retains the structure of the doctrine while requir-
ing that a decision of state law by a state court be allowed only if: (1) the state has a procedure
by which questions of stale law may be certified to the highest state court by a federal court;
(2) if the question of slate law cannot be resolved by the federal court on the basis•of state au-
thorities; and (3) if the federal court makes an express Finding that the certification process
will not cause undue delay or prejudice to the parties. S. 35, § 2 (g)(1), 95th Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1977),
361 S. 35, § 2(g)(3), (3)(A).
362
 S. 35, § 2(g)(3)(C). The section being considered reads:
(3) In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, no court of the United States
shall enjoin a pending criminal prosecution under the law of any State, territory,
subdivision of any State or territory, or the District of Columbia, if such
prosecution—
(C) provides a full and fair opportunity for the presentation and
resolution in the courts of such State, territory, subdivision thereof,
or the District of Columbia, of every claim of deprivation presented
in the action in the court of the United States.
363
 See text at notes 267-275 supra.
3" S. 35, § 2(g)(3). The bill's suggestion that other unnamed extraordinary circum-
stances may be found in a state proceeding is unlike the Court's current position in Trainor
and Juidice. See text and notes at 281-88 supra.
363 S. 35, § 2(g)(3).
366 401 U.S. 37, 54.
367
 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See text and notes 327-31 .supra.
36" S. 35 § 2(g)(4). This section also would require the issuance of a federal injunction if
a finding were made that the subsequent prosecution was initiated because a § 1983 suit had
been filed. A prosecution, commenced under such circumstances, could be interpreted as an
example of the extraordinary circumstances that require injunctive relief. S. 35, § 2003 ).
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would allow a federal court to enjoin a state civil proceeding regardless of
its relationship to state criminal laws and regardless of whether the state
proceedings were pending at the time of filing a section 1983 corn-
1)46110" As a result, Younger abstention would require federal court defer-
ence only to pending state criminal proceedings. 37°
Proposed Senate Bill 35 goes far in reaffirming an overriding con-
gressional intent to provide a federal forum for the vindication of consti-
tutional claims. The bill emphasizes that the only state interest strong
enough to require federal abstention is the interest in enforcement of crim-
inal laws. However, the bill would require even this interest to be balanced
against the criminal defendant's interest in being heard fully and in avoid-
ing irreparable injury. By allowing federal courts the discretion to issue in-
junctions in the face of state civil proceedings"' regardless of the pendency
of those proceedings at the time of filing the section 1983 suit, S. 35 would
avoid the broad and potentially absolute rule against injunctive relief enun-
ciated in Juidice and Trainor.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, infuidice v. Vail and Trainor v. Hernandez has trans-
formed the basis of Younger abstention from equity, comity and federalism to a
rationale of comity and state sovereignty. This change in rationale allowed the
Court to extend the Younger doctrine to civil proceedings in which a state
vindicates an important interest. In doing so, however, the Court has failed to
provide a discernable standard for the future application of the Younger doc-
trine. Although an extension to all civil proceedings remains an open question,
46" S. 35, 2(g)(5). The proposed provision states:
(5) In an action brought under this Act, a court of the United States may enjoin
a proceeding in the courts of any State, territory, subdivision of any State or ter-
ritory, or the District of Columbia, which is noncriminal in nature, even if' such
proceeding is in aid of and closely related to the enforcement of a criminal stat-
ute, ordinance, or regulation, irrespective of whether the proceeding was com-
menced prior to or subsequent to the action.
addition, and in contrast to the Court's statement in Huffinan and implication in
Juidice and Trainor that the presence of unexhausted state remedies requires dismissal of a sec-
tion 1983 action, S. 35 would require that no section 1983 suit be dismissed solely on the basis
of' the availability of state remedies. S. 35, 2(g)(2).
' 71 The Committee on Civil Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, while supporting the provisions of S. 35 which cut back on Huffman, Juidice and Trainor,
expressed concern about. the failure of S. 35 to provide any guidelines for the exercise of this
discretion in granting injunctive relief'. See S. 35, 2(g)(5). The Committee suggested, how-
ever, that
(Oven the primary role of the federal courts in enforcing and vindicating the
rights and interests protected by Section 1983, ... there should be a general pre-
sumption in favor of injunctions of state proceedings which either are com-
menced after a Section 1983 action has been commenced between the same par-
ties or their privies, or which threaten to jeopardize or delay vindication of Sec-
tion 1983 rights. We think this approach is intended by S. 35 and is fairly to be
implied by its text. when read in the context of the recent Supreme Court opin-
ions, the impact of which it is seeking to reverse or modify.
Rep, of the Comm. on Civil Rights of the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York, Imposing
Liability Upon Governments for Civil Rights Violations. and Imposing Limits upon Younger v. Harris:
Pending Legislation to Amend 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 13 (January, 1978), reprinted in 33 Rec. of the
Assoc. of the Bar of the City of' New York, issue 3 (March, 1078).
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the recasting of the Younger rationale in Juidice and Trainor portends the
extension of Younger to all proceedings which vindicate any state interest, if not
a possible extension to all civil litigation pending in state courts.
Juidice and Trainor have brought. the Younger doctrine ever closer to the
absolute ban on federal injunctive relief against state proceedings contained in
the anti-injunction statute. When combined with the recent decision in Hicks v.
Miranda, the recast doctrine allows the state, rather than a potential plaintiff'
under section 1983, to choose the forum in which federal claims will be adjudi-
cated. In so doing, the Court has taken, an unwarranted departure from
the role of the federal judiciary as the primary vindicator of rights under
the Constitution and federal laws.
The importance of the state and federal interests in the confrontation
between federal and state courts over the adjudication of federal rights re-
quires continual adjustment to accommodate those interests. Given the cur-
rent disposition -of the Court, the possibility of such accommodation ap-
pears limited. As a consequence, any remedy forthcoming in this area must
originate in Congress. The power of Congress over the federal judiciary
and its decision to provide a federal forum under section 1983 suggest that
a congressionally devised remedy, such as the Senate Bill 35, is both proper
and necessary.
CYNTHIA L. SHUPE
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